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Dedication 
 
 
Phlebas the Phoenician, a fortnight dead,   
Forgot the cry of gulls, and the deep sea swell 
And the profit and loss… 
 
O you who turn the wheel and look windward, 
Consider Phlebas, who was once handsome and tall as you. 
 
T. S. Eliot, The Wasteland, Part IV, 1922. 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the Cultures of southern Sahara, who keeps me wondering. 
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Abstract 
 
Why is an African federation the home for one of the more dominating criminal networks 
operating globally? Nigeria has one of the world lowest levels of Internet-infrastructure. Still, 
it is in a class of its own when it comes to e-fraud or 419 spam mails. It is also prominent 
within drug trading and trafficking. 
 
By comparatively analysing other forms of Organized Crime against the Nigerian Brand, the 
thesis has tried to find the particulars of Nigerian Criminal Networks. The thesis found two 
particular indicators that stood out in the analysis: Social Networking and the 419 industry. 
After looking at the level of integration between Nigerian politics and Criminal networks, the 
argumentation used by agents within Criminal Networks and the dynamics of the Nigerian E-
fraud, this thesis argues that the same socio-cultural dynamics stemming from before the 
colonial period of the “great scramble” to present time, is the very same driving force behind 
Nigerian Criminal Networks, forming an Internet Economy of Affection.  Individuals growing 
up in the Nigerian federation seem to have a higher potential for social networking since their 
weak state gives them little protection in economic, welfare, security and education spheres. 
They have to rely on the informal sector instead: the sphere of social networking. This may be 
one explanation toward how the dynamics of e-fraud, trafficking and drug-trade in Nigerian 
Criminal Networks, works at present. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nigerian organized crime seems to connote a special type of organized crime, both when it 
comes to scope and peculiarities. Why do Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks dominate 
other forms of Organized Crime both in south-Sahara and abroad in certain areas? For 
example: why are these networks in the forefront of the e-mail fraud industry when Nigeria 
has one of the least developed Internet-infrastructures in the world? 
 
This thesis focuses on the contemporary theoretic works which have been written about 
Nigerian organized crime (NOC) in a comparative analysis set up against other more well 
known forms of organized crime. What factors can be said to stand out when it comes to the 
type NOC seems to represent. Which similarities can be found between NOC and other forms 
of organized crime that cannot be an explanatory factor in what makes NOC different from 
other types? 
 
Even the very definition can appear to be problematic; should we use the catch-all phrase 
Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks (NOCN) to be sure not to leave out any form of 
organized crime not currently being described by criminal sciences or should we dare to be 
more specific? Initially we will use the general phrase NOCN, since we have not properly 
discussed and found sufficient arguments to use a more specific definition as yet. 
 
This chapter will explain the background of my study, the research problem, and give a basic 
sketch of the conceptual and theoretical framework in use. 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The Nigerian organized criminal networks seems significant world wide when it comes to 
visible criminal franchise like e-mail scam or other attempts at e-fraud, and also when it 
comes to covert criminal industry like trafficking and drug transportation. Is it possible the 
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visible (e-fraud) and largely invisible crime spheres are two separate arenas where we have 
some clear data when it comes to e-fraud because its mode of operation always leaves some 
sort of electronic trail, while the hidden criminal industry is much more unclear to which 
ethnic groups actually are responsible for the crime being committed? 
 
If you have an Internet connection and some sort of mail provider, you will most probable 
have experienced the notorious Nigerian e-mail scams or “419 industry” as its known in 
contemporary literature (Buchanan 2001: 39-40, Ebbe 1997: 74, Edelson 2003: 392). How 
can west Africa, and particularly Nigeria, be dominant in a venture so dependent on Internet-
infrastructure?  
 
Nigerians seems to dominate the drug trade in southern-Sahara, for example in South Africa.  
Trafficking of women and labour is also connected to the power-sphere of Nigerian 
Organized Criminal Networks. Cases like Italy (Aghatise 2004: 1134) and Norway (Carling 
2006: 2) seems to show a large percentage of its sex-labour force to originate from Nigeria.  
 
Is this because of a particular historic background? Can its 120 million strong population be 
solely responsible for this? Is it connected to the fragmented ethnic puzzle the Nigerian 
federation is divided into? Or is it the power-structures of the Nigerian state or lack of state 
that dictates this very particular state of affairs? 
 
1.2. Statement of Problem  
 
This thesis will firstly try to draw out the significant differences from Nigerian organized 
criminal networks to underline significant divergent factors in an attempt to find the 
peculiarisms inherent in this subject. It will therefore try to put the more well described forms 
of organized crime, like the Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese in that very order of 
importance up against the Nigerian type of organized criminal networks to discover its 
similarities and discrepancies.  
 
The Italian brand of organized crime is perhaps the best described, together with the factors of 
history, culture and state that has formed its very type. The Italian state history and current 
form has also shown to be important for the understanding of the Italian organized crime and 
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the concept of state linked together with type of organized crime will be an important 
direction to venture in this thesis. 
 
Secondly, the thesis will attempt to find some significant explanation for these peculiarisms in 
Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks. Can it be explained by its type of state, fragmented 
cultural bias, population factor, diaspora or its very cultural and socioeconomic history?  
 
1.3. Significance of study 
 
The most important goal of this thesis is to find the specifics that differ in Nigerian Organized 
Criminal Networks. There are, at this time, no well-known attempts to find the specific factors 
that stand out in Nigerian organized crime and perhaps more importantly, try to find out why 
Nigerian Organized crime works in its particular fashion. This thesis may then of course 
conclude with that NOCN’s has no significant discrepancies from other better known types of 
organized crime, and the difference is merely superficial. This is however unlikely looking at 
the way Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks manifest themselves today. We can on the 
other hand discover that there is a significant difference, but not achieve a plausible 
explanation why there is one in the first place, which is more likely. 
 
As an attempt to draw together the theoretic perspectives and tools of both criminology and 
more state related sciences, the very concept of miscommunication between these two forms 
of science may be an issue. This problem may be most apparent in the methodological part, 
where we try to connect state-science with a more purely criminology oriented theory. On the 
other hand criminology is perhaps an area that should be more scrutinized by social scientists 
as a further tool to explain the workings or failures of state. That the case of organized crime 
is connected to weak states, or a states failure to deliver a sufficient level of security (Sung 
2004:112, Gambetta 1996:4, Rabasa and Chalk 2001:(1, 65), Varese 1997:594, Bandiera 
2003:222), is well known in criminology but maybe less focused on in social sciences. 
Perhaps some time in the future the brands of organized crime, or the very form the organized 
crime takes, may be used as a further indicator to strengthen or weaken theoretic frameworks 
used to explain some parts of the complex machine, we define as State. 
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1.4. Concepts of Methodology 
 
When first embarking on the task of writing a thesis that was meant to do a comparative study 
between Nigerian and other forms of organized criminal networks, some hard choices had to 
be made. To collect data on both of these spheres at the limited amount of time would be 
close to impossible. To collect data on the Nigerian type only would be difficult at best. The 
subject is not an aboveboard sphere of society that is easy to access in the first place. The fact 
that collection of data was to be made in Nigeria made the case even more uncertain taking 
into account the infrastructure and information problems in particular existence here. 
 
This thesis is therefore first and foremost a theoretical one. This means the divide between 
theory and methodology is much more unclear than a quantitative or qualitative thesis. There 
is a divide however, and it lies in the indirectness or directness the text relate to the concept of 
organized crime. The methodology texts are there to underbuild the method of analysing text 
directly relating to organized crime. Concepts of methodology will therefore reflect subjects 
like state, a problematic concept in itself or not, comparisons between culture or 
socioeconomics and historical analysis. 
 
We have already discussed the importance of the state. The state gives us either an indirect or 
direct causal connection to forms of Organized Crime. When no state is present, no law is 
present, the level of security will be minimal and the very concept of organized crime 
becomes almost meaningless. If we can agree to this chain of arguments, the state needs to be 
a part of the arsenal of causal factors explaining workings, origins and underlying factors of 
Organized Crime. However, if the state can explain partly the workings of organized crime, 
the form of organized crime needs to resonate in some degree to the form and workings of the 
state.  If this is not the case our causal factors on organized crime may be spurious.  
 
If the state is to be used as a tool we need to look closer on it is socioeconomic and cultural 
history through different methods of analysis; 
 
A basic perspective is JSS Mill’s modes of induction to single out factors. This method will of 
course be even more important when it comes to the compare between Nigerian and Other 
forms of Organized Criminal Networks. 
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Nettl’s text “The state as a conceptual variable” will give us a basic and fundamental 
discussion and understanding around the very concept of state. This is important to build up a 
further analysis of the weak state connected to organized crime. 
 
Putnam’s “civic traditions in modern Italy” gives us an insight in the particular divide 
between a loose north and south axis between the socio-economic factors dividing Italy. This 
is in accordance with the very same attempt this thesis will make in explaining the differences 
with Nigerian and other forms of organized crime with the state as a causal context. 
 
Lastly Goran Hyden’s economy of affection is perhaps at the time the most general theory 
explaining the significant factors giving southern Sahara its particular brand of society and 
therefore may give us an explanatory background for Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks. 
 
1.5. Disposition of Thesis 
 
The thesis will first try to lay a foundation of methodological tools to attempt to get a 
significant level of comparative factors that is either connected to all forms of organized 
crime or singular to the Nigerian form. We will then describe the way Italian, Chinese, 
Russian and Japanese organized crime have manifested to achieve some level of comparative 
data to use against the current literature on Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks. Having 
described these forms we will try to sum up a basic level of similarity between the Italian, 
Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms to produce a basic connection. This level of connection 
will be used comparatively against the Nigerian and will lead us to; 
 
A. There are no significant discrepancies between Nigerian and other forms of organized 
crime. 
 
Or 
 
B. There are significant differences between Other forms of organized crime and the 
Nigerian Brand. 
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If A is the preliminary result we have to analyse further the implications of this and look upon 
closer upon why such an unexpected result have appeared. If B is the case we need to 
scrutinize the causal explanations why the discrepancies are in place. If we find no significant 
causal factors to explain the difference, this also has to be the thesis main conclusion. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter have explained the central problem this thesis will attempt to analyse. A 
preliminary disposition has also been provided. The next chapter will discuss the 
methodological tools that are needed to achieve a basic level of comparative analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will outline the specifics of analytic tools we have to take into account to achieve 
some basic level of comparison between the main groups of Organized Crime put against the 
Nigerian type. How can we look upon any level of Organized Crime without scrutinizing its 
context of state? How can we use the state as a plausible context for causality without looking 
upon its socio-economic and cultural history? Lastly we will scrutinize the selection of 
sources used in the thesis. 
 
2.1.1. Historical Sociology 
 
Philip Abrahams “Historical sociology” gives us an insight into this way of thinking by his 
work on the ideas of Edward Thompson; regarding the notion of class, sociologists would for 
example all disregard the term: 
 
”The notion of class entains the notion of historical relationship, it is a fluency which evades 
analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise its structure ... 
sociologists who have stopped the time machine and gone down to the engine room and look, 
tell us that nowhere at all can they locate and classify a class. They can only find a multitude 
of people with different occupations, incomes, status hierarchies and the rest. They are right 
of course, because class is not this or that part of the machine, but the way the machine works 
once its set in motion, not this interest or that, but the friction of interests, the movement 
itself, the heat and the thundering noise.” 
(Abrams 1982: xii) 
 
This gives us a good description and understanding into why we need to find some level of 
historic connection to the way the state and therefore indirectly how organized crime have 
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developed, both in Nigeria and in other countries. The state in itself however is not an 
unproblematic concept, specifically when it comes to southern Sahara as Hyden describes in 
his book “African Politics in Comparative Perspective”. We need therefore to discuss the 
implications of the state concept through Nettl’s “The State as a Conceptual Variable”. 
 
2.2. State as conceptual variable 
 
“Insofar as social science aims at scientific reductionism and attempts to separate all 
epiphenomenal or occasional factors from exigencies, fundamentals, and invariants, the 
concept of state is at risk. But if it can be made into an operating variable that points up 
significant differences and discontinuities between societies, making possible systematically 
qualitative or even quantitative distinctions, there may be a case for bringing it back in.” 
(Nettl 1968:562). 
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
 
How can we aptly define the concept of state? The English monarchy and its north American 
offspring are both in different ways atypical states, breaking clearly away from the old 
“Nationstate” definition; The United states through its cultural plurality and federation-
political system, the British commonwealth through its ageing focus on monarchy and former 
colonies (Nettl 1968:561-562). The problems further evolve when one throws the former third 
world colonies into the fray; the African continent for example, which after a rushed 
colonization by European powers in the late 19th century suddenly finds itself in the position 
of creating modern democratic states, without the means and cultural history for achieving 
this anytime soon. As Goran Hyden puts it; 
 
“To most Africans, local community institutions carried much greater legitimacy than the 
civic institutions established by the colonial powers.” 
(Hyden 2006:51). 
 
Nettl sets up four notions of state to achieve a comparative analysis of the subject. 
Firstly Nettl delves into the problem of connecting state and sovereignty. For him, this 
concept is at the same time too broad and too narrow. Firstly to broad by failing to “prepare” 
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the idea at an adequate level in preparation to connect it to other relevant concepts, too narrow 
in the sense that it leaves out much of the spatial and social dimensions. For him the concept 
of sovereign state points exclusively on its status as superordinate over inferior associations, 
and as such hinders the possibility of analyzing the connections with other summatin concepts 
such as nation, society, or territory (Nettl 1968:562).  
 
The state must also be cut off from any “personal” connotations, if this is not the case the state 
devolves into a ragbag synonym of government and looses much of its inherent meaning 
(Nettl 1968:563).  
 
Conceptualizing the state with law, bureaucracy or with government alone recreates an 
artificial, and to a large extent, self-defining notion of state by bundling structures together 
that are better polarized and that are a part of the state in some situations but in many others 
not. These factors may altogether substitute the state in some cases all together (Ibidem).  
 
Secondly, the state represents a unit in the environment of international relations. In the view 
of a sovereign authority as stated by Hobbes, there is a fundamental gap between civil society 
(an area we would today describe as a society or social system), and the international arena, 
with chaotic and random collisions and collusions. In the before mentioned, the state works as 
a basic irreducible unit, equivalent to an individual in a society. In today’s world it is quite 
fashionable to refer to “national actors” rather than states. In this international system the state 
concept generates an almost exclusive and acceptable node of resource mobilization (Ibidem). 
Nettl however focuses his article on the “internal affairs”, so to speak, of the state. The 
meaning is therefore to focus on the societal aspects of the state, connecting the international 
arena by putting the state as a gatekeeper between the internal and international flows of 
action (Nettl 1968:564). 
 
Thirdly, the state represents an autonomous collectivity and a generalized concept of the high 
societal system. As such it can be equalled in a functional sense as a distinct sector or arena of 
society (Ibidem). It is important to emphasize the autonomy aspect. In one aspect this focus 
on a limitation upon sovereignty; every connection points in the direction of a maximization 
of autonomy, and once the idea of a pluralistic view of society is accepted, the greater 
autonomy of the state versus other connections or collectivities becomes a empirical question 
for each particular case (Nettl 1968:565).      
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Fourth, the state is in essence a sociocultural phenomenon. This is connected to the liberation 
from the concept of exclusive connection to particular structures, and from the emphasis on 
autonomy. Friedrich in his generalization of state politics, shows us some of the inherent 
faults in the concept of autonomy:  
 
“Such is the dialectic of the political that the state seeks and must seek to foster the growth of 
a nation, indeed must posit its potential coming into being…” 
(Ibidem). 
 
This is mainly limited to the European arena, and a limited segment of the continental Europa 
at that. What summarize a nation is surely the organized diffusion of common experience as 
Nettl puts it, and this may be amplified and structured by a King, leader church, party, army 
or state – or all of them together (Ibidem). 
 
2.2.2. Three traditions of statehood: Historical 
 
Nettl structures his article by categorizing the notion of statehood or “stateness” into tree 
specific traditions: historic, intellectual and cultural. 
 
The historical tradition is connected to the randomness of events that often lay as primary 
factors for concretization of statehood (Nettl 1968:567). It is, for example, no clear findings of 
a historical state with ethnically homogenous, united and centralized countries; if this was a 
possibility as such, England would manifest an easily accessible pattern of state. The factors 
points in contrary to this in the opposite direction, because it is more likely to find these 
strongly articulated patterns of statehood in countries that were fragmented long after France 
and England was united. The state has then evolved by extending its impact from one 
dominant geographical component to the whole “nation-state”, or it has found a new hybrid of 
“stateless” fragments and unified these. There are then no clear or discernible factors that give 
away the primary foundations for a crystallization of statehood from any easily identifiable 
comparable historical events (Ibidem). 
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The historical state in Europe may therefore be connected to a kind of “state-envy” according 
to Nettl. He finds considerable evidence that the seeking toward stateness on the part of newly 
united European nations was in part linked to deliberate borrowing from envied European 
leaders. The French example from the 17th century and onward was a dominant factor in 
providing conscious and unconscious models for countries seeking national integrative 
revolution in the 19th century (Ibidem). 
 
One can find a number of states like the United States whose historical experience connotes a 
similar connection to “statehood” but where the notion of the state itself has glimmered by its 
absence, or rather been transformed into something of a very different meaning (Nettl 
1968:567-568). It is difficult for a federal system under any circumstance to incorporate any 
meaningful notion of state, since the factors and functions for such a system demands an 
coordination with regional units, and the concept of overall superordination or sovereignty 
will be displaced by the system itself. Autonomy will therefore manifest itself in legal terms 
only, rather than the sociocultural (Nettl 1968:568). 
 
Another factor in the historical analysis of stateness and the identification of a conceptually 
meaningful state concerns the problem of autonomy. Neutral and transformatory structures 
that merely process inputs into outputs and live up to the models emphasized by certain types 
of social science would run directly in opposition to the conceptual components of autonomy 
that is needed. Nettl also points out that the problem of autonomy is quite separate from that 
of sovereignty (Nettl 1968:569):  
 
“..a state may be sovereign as well as autonomous or it may merely be autonomous.” 
  (Ibidem). 
 
As such the German tradition has emphasized sovereignty, the autonomy of the state a natural 
offspring of its sovereign nature. In Italy the autonomy is, on the other hand, clearly defined, 
but the notion of sovereignty is vague and inconsistent in a high degree. Whatever its formal 
claims to sovereignty, the Italian state can be demonstrated to consist of no more than a sector 
of activities polarized from other spheres, but only meaningful sovereign in its own particular 
sphere. According to Nettl, a third alternative exists; a concept of state where the structures 
we would normally ascertain in connection with the state are not autonomous, or at least, 
much less than the non-state ones. Using the example of the United states we can see that 
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there is a clear breach between the well maintained autonomy of certain federal institutions 
such as federal courts, regulatory commissions and departments of the federal government. 
The legislative branch on the other hand is distinguished by its lack of autonomy and by its 
cross-pressures and interests, which has been called “a government of separated institutions 
sharing powers”(Ibidem). 
 
“America perpetuated a fusion of functions and a division of power, while Europe developed 
a differentiation of functions and a centralization of power.” 
Samuel P. Huntington (Nettl 1968:569-570). 
 
2.2.3. Intellectual tradition 
 
Various intellectual and philosophical ideas around the concept of state from Germany have 
played a leading part for over the last 150 years. The range of intellectual tradition of the state 
gives an insight in its position of dominance. It has been a part of even the most 
individualistic approach to social problems, for example psychoanalysis (Nettl 1968:572).  
 
“no German ever escapes Hegel, [even] a German Marxist is suspect of saying Marx when he 
means Hegel.” 
Philip Rieff (Nettl 1968:572-573) 
 
Hegel both summarizes and fathers an intellectual tradition of highly articulate and absolute 
stateness, in which the concept of state is given supreme predominance, but that he transforms 
the cold notion of legal and political sovereignty into a “warm” cultural concept of self-
identification and affect for the state. What Hegel did through his idealized and philosophical 
concept, Freud later perfected with much more personal terms. Love became the factor that 
the basic power of the state rested on. The state becomes a transfer and extension, in terms of 
social development, from the connection between child and parents in a family to the relations 
between subject and state in society. By going from Hegel to Freud, Nettl conceptualize the 
span and importance of intellectual influences that cannot as such be traced directly back to 
Hegel at all (Nettl 1968:572-573): 
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 “The suffusion of German thinking with the concept of state, and the articulation of the state 
as the quintessential sociological phenomenon of modernity through the writings of historians 
like Treitschke and Meinecke, need not be spelled out in detail; in referring to Hegel, we are 
merely encapsulating a widespread and dominant intellectual tradition which by no means 
adopts his particular phenomenology or dialectical form of analysis.” 
(Nettl 1968:573). 
 
2.2.4. The cultural tradition 
 
The state concept as it stands in itself and the way it is manifested in society, can be 
transformed in various ways to meet specific demands of cultural variables in a political 
context (Nettl 1968:578).  
 
In the example of the USSR, where the soviet state had a strong hand in the development of 
soviet society, we find that the apparently co-opting functions of the USSR state were in fact, 
in most instances, handled by the Party – a singular and autonomous structure whose position 
in the Soviet state hierarchy has been on the outside rather than the inside. Looking for Nettl’s 
level of autonomy to denote any meaningful concept of state, we only find it with the party 
itself, instead of the USSR state. The concept of the Soviet citizen is also an important one in 
this regard. Instead of creating a soviet citizenship, separate and above ethnic communities, 
through the creation of a Soviet state, Nettl argues that the dynamics behind the Soviet citizen 
status lie in close conjuncture with the American citizen dynamics. Rather than identifying 
directly to the state, both the American and Soviet identity is connected to a “crystallization of 
status” as Nettl puts it. It is connected firmly to the concept of “way of life”, either soviet or 
American, and is connected to this concept rather than the state itself (Nettl 1968:579). 
 
2.2.5. Third world states 
 
The state is far from being institutionalized into the political system of third world countries. 
What appears to be the case is rather a focus on parties rather on the state, this even in 
countries ruled by military dictatorships, where one could expect a larger chance of some 
degree of state-building (Nettl 1968:589).  
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The state-building “implosions” that generated the new state-centred nations of Europe, never 
took place in the third worlds, but rather a multi-ethnic “explosion” fuelled by colonial legacy 
and insurrectionary organizations (Nettl 1968:590-591). 
 
2.2.6. Closing on state as a variable 
 
The state as concept, though present in most socio-political analysis, is still victim of a 
multitude of definitional problems. Universal definitions of the state, Weber is one example of 
an attempt at universalizing the concept of state, shows us the geographical problem, that the 
state is functioning in different ways in different global spheres, which has not been properly 
addressed in western tradition of state definition. Nettl suggests that “stateness” is a variable 
that is useful for comparing Western societies and that the presence and absence of the 
concept of state identifies important empirical differences in these societies (Nettl 1968: 591-
592). 
 
2.2.7. Methodological implications of state as variable 
 
Firstly Nettl’s discussion regarding the concept of state gives us an important foundation 
when it comes to the inherent differences between states. In which way will sovereignty 
dictate a states composition and ability to hold together? Nettl argues that the implicit 
connection to sovereignty is not in itself enough to explain the concept. Nettl uses the African 
continent as an important argument when it comes to this problem. And it is exactly the 
inherent differences between African organized criminal networks and other organized crime 
based groups that this thesis tries to analyse. What implications will the colonization of 
southern Sahara have in the current form of state and contemporary Nigerian Organized 
Criminal networks? This is a question that Nettl together with Hyden gives us a theoretical 
significance to aptly raise.  
 
Looking at Nettl’s divide in forms of statehood the historical and cultural perspective will 
most likely important in the discussion of Economy of affection and the Nigerian state. Like 
Nettl’s case of the United States, were a meaningful concept of state gets event trickier 
through the fact that the federal system will manifest itself through legal terms rather than the 
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sociocultural. This has to have some impact on the Nigerian federation too, put together with 
the already problematic concept of state that has evolved after colonization. 
 
When it comes to the Italian organized crime, Nettl also gives us some basis for discussion as 
he views the state in this case as consisting of no more than a sector of activites polarized 
from other spheres. Together with Putnam’s article about the divided Italy, this will give us a 
further foundation for discussing the specific context of organized crime in the region. The 
intellectual perspective is perhaps the least meaningful connected to the Nigerian sphere or 
the economy of affection because it has to involve some kind of historic cultural background 
that has not been in play in Nigeria’s relative short history as a state. The cultural tradition 
therefore stands out as even more significant as the economy of affection, which we will 
discuss later, is a general cultural background in the southern Saharan region.  
 
We particularly must note Nettl’s point around the socio-cultural foundation for the state. 
Science reductionism towards explaining state solely as a power-monopoly structure is a 
weak notion according to Nettl. We must understand the historic and socio-cultural 
foundations that must be in place for a state to achieve a high enough level of acceptance to 
exist. Nettl, concludes broadly on both Federal states and third world states particular 
problems when it comes to this. Here we have, in effect, states with neither a long history of 
statehood and no great socio-cultural acceptance of the state as mentioned in the literature 
from Hyden and Ekeh. When it comes specific to Nigeria, it is a Federation on top of it all. To 
summarize; most of the indicator that Nettl describes as being particular problematic toward 
the establishment of state-acceptance is in play when it comes to Nigeria:  
 
1. It is a third world state with its colonial past 
 
2. It is a federation  
 
3. It has no long tradition for statehood or any intellectual past linked to state. 
 
4. It has no sociocultural affinity toward state-structure, as explained in both Ekeh’s “two 
publics”, and Hyden’s Economy of Affection. 
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We have therefore through Nettl’s Historical, Cultural and intellectual perspectives on state 
shown some of the very fundamental problems connected to the Nigerian Federation. 
 
Lastly, in his focus on third world states, we come close to the thesis problem. The state is 
even less a meaningful concept in this region than it is in the rest of the world. What 
implications will the multi-ethnic “explosions” that was fuelled by the colonial legacy have on 
the Nigerian form of Organized Criminal Networks? 
 
2.3. The Italian divide 
 
2.3.1. Introduction Putnam 
 
The significance of this text is twofold. First of all it gives us a basic insight in the 
comparative analysis of two institutional divided geographic areas on a state level. The thesis 
is meant to use the same statement of problem when it comes to explaining potential 
differences between Nigerian context and other cases. This potential divide exists on an 
international scale rather than Putnam’s national one, but the basics of comparison and 
explanation is the same. Secondly, the fact that the divide between southern and northern Italy 
is so large, may give us a connection to the Economy of Affection and the means to analyse 
this concept in a broader sense. 
 
2.3.2. Civic Traditions 
 
In Robert D. Putnams Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy, Putnam 
describes a divide between democratic institutional capacity between northern Italy and south 
(Putman1994:5). By asking the question of how social, economic and culture influence 
democratic performance, he sketches an image of a divide, ruled by an historical context and 
socio-economic contemporary factors. 
 
In the early 1970s Italy started a process of sudden transference of administrative power from 
centralized Rome, to the Italian regions (Putnam1994:4). The transfer included civic problems 
like health, safety among others (Ibid.). Since the unification of Italy in 1870 no attempts 
before the 1970 on decentralization to the regions was ever made (Putnam1994:5). Italy was a 
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centralized state, perhaps a consequence of trying to break from the largely city-state ruled 
past. Putnam tries to follow and interpret the consequence and difference manifested by the 
“regional-reforms”. In the north (Bologna) a description of Habermasian “deliberate paradise” 
ensues, where citizens gathers on the local piazza1 debating the days political agenda which 
echoes can be heard in the chambers of the regional council (Putnam 1994: 6). In the south 
(Bari, Puglia), the Puglesi has problems even locating the regional administration, not to 
mention the fact that said regional office consists of largely empty desks (Putnam 1994: 5). 
Further, the public system of administration is bogged down by internal feuds and 
institutionalized corruption: 
 
“A rampant spoils system undermines administrative efficiency: as a clerk once responded to 
his nominal superior in our presence, “you can’t give me orders! I am ‘well protected’.” 
Meanwhile, the region’s leaders engage in Byzantine factional feuds over patronage and 
posts, and offer rhetorical promises of regional renewal that seem never to reach reality. If 
Puglia is to become “a new California”, as local boosters sometimes say, it will be despite the 
performance of its new regional government, not because of it.” 
(Putnam1994: 5) 
 
It is therefore prudent of Putnam to ask the question regarding the conditions for creating 
strong, responsive, effective representative institutions (Putnam1994: 6)? Why is the inherent 
variation between southern and northern Italy so strong? 
 
The reforms of the 1970s gives an opportunity to try out some hypothesises regarding these 
questions. The fifteen regional governments were established at the same time, all with the 
same constitutional mandates and structures. 5 special regions were given some wider 
constitutional guaranteed powers. Putnam uses all 20 regions for his comparative analysis 
(Ibidem). 
 
Looking at the broad picture, all 20 regions are almost identical. Looking more at the context 
of the regions reveals the social, economic, political and cultural differences that have shaped 
the administration of these regions for the decades that have passed since the 70s reforms. 
Some regions were influenced by a political socialistic past, some were stringer influenced by 
                                                 
1
 Italian municipal common. 
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the Catholic Church, some regions even retained the patron-client system of the feudal past 
(Putnam1994: 6-7). As Putnam aptly puts it, looking at these different regions and their 
administrative development gave an important insight in these different ‘biospheres of 
context’: 
 
“The Italian regional experiment was tailor-made for a comparative study of the dynamics and 
ecology of institutional development. Just as a botanist might study plant development by 
measuring the growth of genetically identical seeds sown in different plots, so a student of 
government performance might examine the fate of these new organizations, formally 
identical, in their diverse social and economic and cultural and political settings.” 
(Putnam 1994: 7). 
 
2.3.3. New institutionalism 
 
New institutionalism is a broad spectre of hypothesises where the tools of game theory and 
rational choice models have been used (Ibidem). Theorists of organizational systems have 
used and focused on institutional roles, routines, symbols and duties. Historical 
institutionalists have traced red threads of government and politics emphasizing on timing and 
sequences in institutional development (Ibidem). 
 
There are many diverse views and opinions on the theoretical and methodological points of 
new institutionalism. On two important points they agree, however: 
 
1. “Institutions shape politics. The rules and standard operating procedures that make up 
institutions leave their imprint on political outcomes by structuring political behaviour. 
Outcomes are not simply reducible to the billiard-ball interaction of individuals nor to 
the intersection of broad social forces. Institutions influence outcomes because they 
shape actors’ identities, power, and strategies. 
2. Institutions are shaped by history. Whatever other factors may affect their form, 
institutions have inertia and “robustness”. They therefore embody historical 
trajectories and turning points. History matters because it is “path dependent”:  
what comes first (even if it was in some sense “accidental”) conditions what comes 
later. Individuals may “choose” their institutions, but they do not choose them under 
circumstances of their own making, and their choices in turn influence the rules within 
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which their successors choose. 
  (Putnam 1994: 7-8) 
 
Putnam’s study of the regional reform experiment is meant to focus on both of these themes. 
Using institutions as an independent variable, he empirically explores how institutional 
change influence identity, power and strategies of political actors. In a later part, taking 
institutions as a dependent variable by exploring how institutional performance is influenced 
by history. Putnam expands the field of new institutionalism by adding a third step: the 
practical performance of institutions, he conjectures, is formed by the social context which 
they operate in (Putnam1994:8). 
 
2.3.4. Institutional performance 
 
What is the inherent meaning of institutional performance? Political theorists may see them as 
“the rules of the game”, procedures that govern collective decision-making, as systems that 
deal and sometimes resolve conflict. Putnam furthers this thesis by adding that institutions are 
not only devices for achieving agreement but also a device for achieving purpose. 
Governments should do things, not only decide things; to educate children, deliver social 
services, deliver security, create a functional job-market, manage the economy, encourage 
social stability etc. (Putnam1994:8-9). 
 
Comparative social sciences have also shown an interest in institutional performance. One 
may name three broad schools of explaining performance, which one can find in existing 
literature. The first, “school of thought”, has its focus on institutional design. Rooted in 
formal legal studies, and a mode of political analysis that grew out of the enthusiasm 
surrounding constitution building in the 19th century. John Stuart Mill “Considerations on 
representative Government” is representative for this brand of school (Putnam1994: 9). 
 
Today, a focus on the organizational determinants of institutional performance has appeared 
among the advocates of the “new institutionalism”, and among practical reformers: 
“Arturo Israel, a specialist in Third World development, observes that it is easier to build a 
road than to build an organization to maintain that road” (Putnam1994: 10). 
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Putnam’s research speaks only indirectly to these questions of institutional design. His 
research does in fact hold institutional design as a constant because the regional governments 
with similar organizational structures were all introduced at the same time. What on the other 
hand varied in Putnam’s study was the context of the institutions: economic or political 
tradition. These kind of factors are much more robust to change in a short-term notice. The 
upside is of course the fact that the similarity between the institutional design creates an 
environment that even easier detect the contextual differences and implications of these 
differences (Ibidem). 
 
2.3.5. Concluding on Putnam 
 
After looking at Putnam’s points regarding the north south divide we can partially conclude 
that Hyden’s economy of affection is not exclusive to the area of southern Sahara. When it 
comes to Europe for example, the Mediterranean countries seem to manifest a particular 
affinity for the concept. The very term Putnam uses; institutionalized corruption, resonates 
with Hyden’s point of the informal being institutionalized to the point that they are 
dominating the way formal institutions operate. There is of course great variety between the 
level of economy of affection in the different Mediterranean countries. The case that Putnam 
makes in his text underlines this to some degree. It would therefore be likely that the same 
variation is significant to different parts of southern Sahara. 
 
Another important point Putnam makes is that Institutions are shaped by history. This will be 
important in the explanation of the Economy of affection. What factors or historical paths 
have shaped this current state of affairs in southern Sahara, and more importantly can we 
connect the same paths to the development of the Nigerian brand of Organized crime? 
 
2.4. Comparative Induction 
 
2.4.1. Introduction 
 
The works of Johannes Kepler and Tycho Brae in the 16th century are some of the beginnings 
of scientific method. John Stuart Mill work on inductive logic is perhaps one of the more 
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central theoretical works on the cornerstones of scientific method. In the book “A System of 
logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive” 1843, Mills expansive broad work also focuses on the 
proper (and improper) uses of the term Induction. As we mentioned Kepler in the beginning, 
it could be interesting to mention that Mill did not view Keplers discovery of planetary 
elliptical trajectories was a result of inductive work, but rather a series of direct observations. 
As a sailing captain who makes his first landfall will not know if the landmass in front of him 
is an island or a continent, he needs to sail around the landmass to properly ascertain that it is 
in fact an island. This is done by a series of direct observations. The same observations that 
Kepler made in the 16th century, by not only fixing the planets relative positions, but also their 
curvature, of course a much more difficult work then merely sailing around an island as Mills 
states (Mill 1843:193).  
 
2.4.2. Methods of agreement and difference 
 
Mills looks at Induction as a theoretical tool for providing proof: 
 
“Induction is proof: it is inferring something unobserved from something observed, it requires 
therefore, an appropriate test of proof, and to provide that test is the special purpose of 
inductive logic” (John Stuart Mill, 1843 p.199). 
 
Nature for Mills is a series of almost endless complex phenomenon. If we therefore in nature 
experience recurrence of the same phenomenon in the same context, we both consciously and 
passively assign an expectation of the same phenomenon to appear at the given conjuncture of 
context and factors (Mill 1843:203 and 206).   
 
There are two experimental methods: 
 
1. Method of agreement; 
By looking at two instances of a phenomenon, and finding that only one factor or 
circumstance in common, that factor is the cause, effect or important part of that phenomenon. 
Mills use the example of the man shot through the hearth as a description of this method; the 
man was in his fullness of life before the wound, no circumstance have changed except the 
wound itself, therefore the wound is the cause of his death (Mill 1843:255 - 256). 
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2. Method of difference; 
If you have two instances where the phenomenon occurs, and where it does not, and both 
instances have every factor in common except one, this anomalous factor is the cause, effect 
or important part of that phenomenon (Mill 1843:256). 
 
2.4.3. Concluding on JSS Mill’s methods. 
 
In this thesis we will use Mill’s method of agreement when it comes to explaining a set of 
factors that all Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms of organized crime share to some 
degree in chapter 3. These sets of shared factors will be put up against Nigerian Organized 
Criminal Networks characteristics to try to find some degree of discrepancy, and thereby 
using Mill’s method of difference. 
 
2.5. Economy of affection 
 
2.5.1. Introducing the Economy of affection. 
 
While having no strong state to give basic security, Hydens theory states that the African 
solution is to knit informal networks with your fellow man to replace some of the state lack of 
security nets. The very social mechanics or intelligence involved in such a network building is 
the same one that will need to approach foreigners and strangers via the Internet to facilitate 
for example e-fraud. This may be the very area that sub-Saharans surpass other continents; 
network-building.  
 
Some further questions arise; why aren’t all of Africa dominant actors in Organized Criminal 
Networks and not mostly Nigeria? Can the population plus diaspora be the only explanation? 
Or should we look at some further divide on the economy of affection between the regions in 
Africa?  
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2.5.2. Quo Vadis 
 
“Quo vadis1?” asks Goran Hyden in his book “African Politics in Comparative Perpective” 
(Cambridge, 2006). The question is asked to the contemporary sub-Saharan continent 
regarding its way forward toward democracy and development.  
 
Hyden’s book is a compact insight into the many problems and differences that riddles the 
sub-Saharan continent. The continent stands out in a singular way contemplating its marginal 
economic situation, and democratic vacuum. However, such a generalization covering one of 
the worlds most expansive continents are problematic, but still important when a pattern of 
informality and social networking predominates the area.  
 
As Hyden states as his most important notion explaining contemporary African politics, the 
economy of affection is first and foremost an understanding that people, and not recourses, is 
the currency of sub-Sahara; large networks of persons leads to monetary affluence, not the 
other way around as a more western modernistic approach could lead us to believe. Sub-
Sahara has a long history of slave economy, both transatlantic and locally. The transatlantic 
triangle between Europe, the African west-coast and the Americas is both well known and 
described. However the local African inter-tribal slavery is not. The classical connection 
between state-services and taxation on agricultural produce has historically never been a 
factor in sub-Sahara. However slave economy has been one of the more important economic 
factors in the pre-colonial times (Hyden 2006:141-142). Tribal wars have been one way of 
obtaining slaves, direct obtainment through raids another. That a slave economy existed both 
locally through native means, and transatlantic through foreign means, show us some of the 
foundations of the economy of affection. It also gives us an understanding regarding why sub-
Sahara and west-Africa differs both economically and socially.  
 
“The informal has been institutionalized to the point where it tends to dominate the way 
formal institutions operate. Formal rules, for instance, are often bent to serve informal 
institutions. The informal institutions are not unique to Africa, but their significance is 
                                                 
1
 The question has its origin in Peters question to Jesus while he flees crucifixion in Rome; “Quo vadis 
Domine”; where goes the way lord?  
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particularly noticeable there. Nowhere else can they be studied more extensively than in 
African countries” (Hyden 2006:72) 
 
One may even go so far to call this economy of affection as a fundamental social logic, 
particularly as these institutions permeate social life and political life. It is more important 
who you know than what you know, sharing wealth is prioritized rather than investing wealth 
and helping your fellow man today generates returns tomorrow. These three notions can be 
called an essence of the economy of affection (Ibidem). 
 
This economy can be said to diverge from both capitalism and socialism. Money is not the 
final goal of the day and the state is not the primary mechanism for redistributing wealth. The 
handshake is more important than the written contract; personal discretion is used to allocate 
resources rather than official policy. As such, one may claim it coexists with capitalism and 
socialism, helping individuals to get around these two systems. The economy of affection is 
invisible, leaving no formal or official trace and does not go into some system of registration. 
It frustrates policy makers and economists alike, leaving them no possible solutions to 
incorporate the economy of affection into their analysis or calculations (Ibidem).  
 
2.5.3. Definition on Economy of affection 
 
Definition:  
 
“The easiest way of describing the economy of affection is to suggest that it is constituted by 
personal investments in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of achieving 
goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain.”  
(Hyden 2006:73) 
 
It is important to note that many instances of investments may be incidental or a form of 
regularized behaviour, but not necessarily an institution. To approach public officials to 
obtain an illegal licence or piece of property, is probably not part of an informal institution, 
but exercising affective behaviour to achieve advantages. In the economy of affection 
however, informal institutions arises and a code of unwritten rules develop to guide their 
activities and sanctions of those who may break the rules (Hyden 2006:73-74) 
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2.5.4. Economy of affection in Nigeria 
 
“As Barber writes about Yoruba society in south-western Nigeria: 
[Yoruba society was] animated by a dynamic, competitive struggle for self-aggrandisement, 
which permeated the society from top to bottom. There was scope for people to create a place 
for themselves and expand it by their own efforts. Like the “Big Men” of New Guinea, they 
did it through the recruitment of supporters. A Yoruba proverb says, “I have money, I have 
people, what else is there that I have not got?” Money was one of the principal ways of 
gaining public acknowledgement as a big man; but “having people” constituted that 
acknowledgement itself.”  
(Hyden 2006:74) 
 
The economy of affection cannot be viewed as only a negative cultural institution. It also 
works as a medium for the attempt to reach a common good. Institutionalizing affective 
norms tend to work best in small communities. One example can be the rotating credit 
institutions, like “esusu” among the Yoruba in western Nigeria and “adaski” among the Hausa 
of Northern Nigeria (Hyden 2006:76). 
 
The Nigerian sociologist Peter Ekeh was perhaps the first scholar to question some 
fundamental social science perspectives when it comes to African countries. He stated that 
these where characterized by a much higher level of tension between community and state 
(Hyden 2006:52). This view may be in accordance with the level of socio-professional 
friction existing in south-Sahara or the divide between the formal and informal. 
 
In his insightful article “Colonialism and the Two publics in Africa: A Theoretical 
Statement,” (Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol 17, no I, pp 21-112.) Ekeh 
describes a breach in trust between the civil society and the states civil service. Local 
community based on social organization such as lineage, clan or tribe is a far more potent 
social security than the states civil service for the average African (Ekeh 1975:107).   
The duality between a primordial public and civic public creates an amoral orientation toward 
the civic, where corruption is looked upon as opportunity, while the primordial public realm is 
viewed as moral where corruption is harshly sanctioned (Ekeh 1975:110). The implications of 
these views are interesting. To look upon the state as legitimate prey, as Hyden also states, 
gives us some connotations why the political-criminal nexus is a possibility in Nigeria.  
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Pre-colonial Nigeria did not have the same emphasis on lineage or corporate entity as the 
post-colonial subject. People were relating to city-states, kingdoms or quasi-kingdoms. Others 
again centered themselves around the concept of village with no larger conceptions of 
political affiliation. The colonial project of drawing new ethnic map may even be responsible 
for much of the current languages (Ekeh 1975:105). 
 
Important contemporary ethnic concepts like Yoruba or Ibo was strengthened through small 
nation-state-like projects, were prominent leaders of the groups toured Nigeria in an attempt 
to strengthen these ethnic-corporate entities. One may find instances where villages needed 
convincing that they were a part of the Ibo nation (Ibidem); 
 
“In the 1930's many Aro and Onitsha Ibos consciously rejected identification as Ibos, 
preferring to think of themselves as separate, superior groups. The very term 'Yoruba' was 
popularized by Church Missionary Society leaders during the nineteenth century who were 
anxious to produce a Bible in a uniform language for several city-states that were warring 
against each other at the time.”  
(Ekeh, 1975:105)   
 
On the one hand, Nigeria is a federal state with a large variety of fragmented ethnic groups 
spread out over a geographical area. As Ekeh points out, these nations in themselves are partly 
a product of colonialism, disconnecting them from the concept of the Nigeria state, not only 
once, but doubly: firstly by a state that copies the geopolitical colonial project, secondly by 
the very loose and spurious segmenting of ethnic affiliation that was also attempted 
strengthened in colonial times, and in some instances even partly constructed. 
 
The two publics, one civic and one primordial, harmonize with Hyden’s Economy of 
affection. On the one hand Africans “bend backwards”, as Ekeh describes it, to meet the 
needs and demands of their primordial publics, the civic only exists as a arena of resource 
without returning anything the other way. The colonial projects disconnect from its mother-
country fermented the idea that the state was an overflowing horn of plenty that could never 
run out of funds; the civic public could never be impoverished. The primordial public, on the 
other hand, is pictured as an arena in need of careful care, even from the civic public itself 
(Ekeh 1975:107-108). 
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2.5.5. The particular case of southern-Sahara 
 
In the period from the 1870s toward the beginning of the 1910s 110 million severely surprised 
subjects suddenly find themselves under a European flag. The chaotic and escalating way this 
colonization took place was named “torrschlusspanik” by the “iron”-Chancellor Bismarck, a 
way to describe the panic that broke out, between major European nation-states when the last 
uncolonized area of the world was up for grabs. After about 50 years of the colonial project 
delivering the three C’s (Christianity, civilization and commerce) among other things, the 
process reverses. A “scramble out of Africa” takes place in an even quicker break-neck pace, 
after the inherent ethical and economic problems regarding colonization became more and 
more clear. Most of Africa is de-colonized and “free” within 1968 (Greaves 1996:1111-1112). 
 
Most of southern Sahara shares these historical characteristics, on one hand it may explain the 
level of basic cultural similarities between south Saharan countries, like in the Economy of 
affection, on the other hand it may also explain, in itself, the weighting on the informal rather 
than the formal. However, how can we not take into account the historical factors leading up 
to today’s contemporary situation? Hydens theory is based on these given historical factors 
leading up to an emphasis on the informal today (Hyden 2006:72). How can we then not use 
the economy of affection in connection with Nigerian organized crime? 
 
We must also not forget that Hyden uses examples from Nigeria, like the Yoruba culture, in 
his chapter about economy of affection (Hyden 2006:74) and that his urban-rural links is 
exemplified from Nigeria and generalized loosely onward to Africa as a whole (Hyden 
2006:77). Further, in the two chapters building up to economy of affection, the Nigerian 
sociologist Ekeh uses mainly Nigerian examples to explain his two publics, and his theory is 
perhaps one of the cornerstones in Hyden’s theoretical foundation for economy of affection. 
 
On the one hand Hyden’s theory is exemplified often in the Nigerian context, on the other 
hand how can we not attempt to explain Nigerian OCN without looking at the particular 
historical context that has possibly lead up to economy of affection? 
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2.5.6. Concluding on Economy of affection 
 
Hyden’s economy of affection together with Ekehs two publics gives us an important insight 
into socioeconomic structures in southern Sahara and Nigeria. People are important, not 
money directly, as money is a way to get stronger networks of people. Remembering 
Putnam’s points regarding the south in Italy, the same dynamics are in place, but not in the 
sense that it dominates the formal institutions to the same level.  Hyden states that informal 
institutions are not unique to Africa, but their significance is particularly in play at this area. 
 
Another question that rises when looking at Nettl, Ekeh and Hyden together is the question of 
ethnicity. The ethnically fragmented federation of Nigeria is an important factor when 
remembering Nettl’s point on Soviet-Russia and the United States. At the one hand the ethnic 
divide in a federation is problematic enough when it comes to the trust in a state without some 
project of super-identity like the Soviet or American dream. But tossing the economy of 
affection and its historical background into the mix, the implications can only be more severe. 
This in connection that organized crime thrives in the context of weak states that has little or 
no trust in its citizens as discussed in part 1.3.  
 
Finally, the historic background for the contemporary south Saharan states and the Nigerian 
federation are probably unique. The level of change over so short a period of time in 
cornerstone institutions in society must have an impact not only leading to the economy of 
affection, but in some degree to the specific brand of Nigerian organized crime also. 
As Thompson pointed out in his metaphor toward class-relations, and Abrams used to explain 
historical method, we have here an example on how the machine have worked, the friction, 
the sound and the heat, that has led us up to the particular form of the Nigerian federation and 
Organized Criminal Networks have today. 
 
2.6. Critique of sources 
 
2.6.1. Introduction 
 
In this part of the chapter we will look on the sources positive or negative credentials. The 
following table (table 2.6) will be divided broadly between scientific journals and books. 
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When it comes to books we have no other means to look for their qualities than the apparent 
level of citations that have already been done together with a more general view of the 
sources acceptance in science. When it comes to journals an important indicator of its 
qualities will be if it is at least under peer-review secondly the level of citation. Lastly we will 
also have a variable of significance for the thesis. Some of the texts in use are more important 
than others when it comes to underbuilding the central arguments in the thesis. 
 
When it comes to level of citation, this is collected from the Google scholar search engine, 
because this is the most readily available and extensive data source connected to citations. 
This means, however, that we have to take the numbers with a large portion of salt. Probably, 
only very high levels of citation will give us any meaningful indicator on a source’s strengths 
and weaknesses as the scholar search engine only has a limited selection of citations to draw 
from.   
 
Table 2.6. Sources 
 Journal Peer-R. Book Citations Significance 
Abrams, P. “Historical Sociology” 
  X 772  
Adesina, O. A. “Edo sex trade” X   2  
Agbu, O. “Corruption and Traff.” X X  15  
Allum, F. “Org. Crime in Europe” X X  8  
Aning, K. “West Afr. Crim. Net.” X X  2  
Bandiera, O. “Origins of Mafia” X X  42  
Bastian, M. “Nigerians on Internet” X X  23  
Block, A. “Org. Crim. New York” 
  X 87 X 
Buchanan, J. “Nigerian Fraud” X   9  
Chambers, I. “Migrancy, Identity” 
  X 604  
Chinn, M. D. “Global dig. divide” X X  211  
Dreyer, W. A. “Church & Govern” X X  0  
Ebbe, O. “Pol. Crim. Paper” X X  1  
Ebbe, O, “Pol. Crim. Nexus” X X  9 X 
Edelson, E. “419 scam” X X  8  
Ekeh, P. “Two Publics” X X  373 X 
Gambetta, D. “Distrust” 
  X 178  
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 Journal Peer-R. Book Citations Significance 
Gambetta, D. “Sicilian Mafia” 
  X 639  
Greaves, R. “Civilizations” 
  X 2  
Hagan, F. “Organized Crime” X X  10  
Hyden, G. “Afr. Pol. Comparative” 
  X 113 X 
Klein, A. “Nigerian drug trade” 
  X 0  
Legget, T. “Rainbow Vice” 
  X 40  
Longe, O. “Cyber Crime” X X  2  
Mamdani, M. “Citizen & Subject” 
  X 2065 X 
Mazzitelli, A. “Org. Crim.W. Afr.” X X  15 X 
Mcillwain, J. “Social Network” X X  60 X 
Mill, J. “System of Logic” 
  X 1842  
Milhaupt, C. “Private Ordering” X X  113  
Mutula, S. “Cyber Café industry” X X  20  
Myers, W. “Org. Crim. China” X X  36  
Nettl, J “State as Concept” X X  465 X 
Peel, M. “Nigeria links Britain” X   8  
Putnam, R. “Civic Traditions” 
  X 13275 X 
Rabasa, A. “Columbian lab.” 
  X 110  
Shaw, M. “Crim. N. in SA” X X  11  
Shelley, L. “Trafficking” X   38  
Smith, R. “Advance fee fraud” X X  27  
Sung, H. “State failure” X X  15  
UN “Org. Crim. W. Africa” 
  X  X 
Varese, F. “Sicily future Russia?” X X  101  
Varese, F. “Post-Socialist Russ.” X X  54  
Wannenburg, G. “Org. Crim. WA” X X  10  
Bloom, D. “African Population” 
  X 240  
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2.6.2. Discussion of significant sources 
 
Alan Block, “East Side–West Side: Organizing Crime in New York City”. 
This text is significant because it lays the level of defining the concept of organized crime in 
the thesis, the connection between upper and lower level segments of society. All other 
organizational forms used in the thesis are all derived from this basic formula. When I use the 
loose criminal network form like the Nigerian, or the hierarchical organized form like, for 
example, the Italian, they all are based on Block’s concept of upper and lower level 
connection. 
 
The text from the book used in the thesis does not show any blatant particular weaknesses. As 
a book its not peer reviewed, so we don’t have any clear way of deeming it clearly accepted or 
approved of on a scientific level. 
 
Ebbe, O. “Political-Criminal Nexus: The Nigerian Case: Slicing Nigeria's 'National Cake'” 
This text is significant in the way it connects the social network factor to Nigeria, and the 
particular level social networks play in Nigeria. It does not enjoy a particular high level of 
citation, still, the journal is peer-reviewed, and this should involve at least a competent level 
of scientific quality. 
 
Ekeh, P. “Colonialism and the Two publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement” 
The text has been around for 35 years, and is still relevant for discussion of African Politics 
and society. It is important to the thesis as it gives the particular view of a Nigerian on the 
case of the colonial background and the institutions formed by the very same colonial past. 
 
Hyden, G.  “African Politics in Comparative Perspective” 
This is maybe the most important text for the thesis. As a book we cannot clearly state that its 
quality is undisputed, however, the text seems to enjoy an acceptance in African-sphere 
science. Mamdani have criticised the book for giving a wrong view on the “uncaptured” 
peasant class of the rural. This is however not significant to the thesis as the class relations 
from the urban and rural is not an important part of the discussion. This may perhaps also 
stem from Mamdani’s research primarily being based in east-Africa and Hyden’s in west-
Africa. The book seems to have an acceptable level of citations. We may however criticise 
Hyden for a very broad general analysis for vast areas that is cultural fragmented. 
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Mamdani, M. “Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism” 
A classic within African political theory, this text also shows its scientific acceptance through 
its high level of citations. The book is important for the thesis as it is another significant 
argument how the colonial past form the present shape of African politics as both Ekeh and 
Hyden argues. Just like Hyden’s book, it may however suffer from generalizing vast 
fragmented cultural areas. 
 
Mazzitelli, A. “Transnational organized crime in West Africa: the additional challenge” 
Important for the thesis as it gives us a set of indicators to describe west-African and Nigerian 
forms of criminal-networks. Comes from a peer-reviewed journal, and that Mazzitelli is head 
of the regional office for Central and West Africa of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), gives us at least an indicator that he is competent in the field he is 
describing. 
 
Mcillwain, J. “Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach” 
Implicit important through the one connection between other forms of Organized crime and 
Nigerian Criminal networks that was significant: Social Networking. Comes from a peer-
reviewed journal and seems to be an accepted work of scientific level. 
 
Nettl, J. P. “The State as a Conceptual Variable” 
This is an old and tested text that has very good credentials. Important for the text in its 
discussion around the state-concept that we connect to the weak-state connected to organized 
crime discussion, and the particular problems of African states. 
 
Putnam, R. “Making Democracy Work: Civil Traditions in Modern Italy” 
Classic text that enjoys a seemingly high level of citations. Gives an important insight into 
how the economy of affection also is in place in Europe. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Transnational Organized Crime in the West 
African Region” 
Is important for the text since it gives us some rare detailed insights into the way Nigerian 
Criminal Networks dynamics works in society. Is a collective work between groups of 
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scientist within the field, and must as such be deemed a work of scientific quality and 
relevance. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
We have in this chapter gone through the analytic tools we need to both make a foundation for 
discussion and a more extensive discourse of comparison. We have also gone through the 
source material in use in the thesis, looking out for apparent strengths or weaknesses.    
 
It is important to outline the links and red threads extending from each of the articles 
described in this chapter of methodology. We can see how Ekeh’s point is connected to the 
works of Nettl and Putnam in his description of a divided public like Putnam’s 
institutionalized corruption in southern Italy, and the fragmented federation and its inherent 
problems connected to Nettl’s theory. Ekeh is also a cornerstone in Hyden’s Economy of 
affection, and both authors use Nigeria as an important case for their conclusions. We have 
therefore already set up a framework to use in the comparison of Nigerian and other forms of 
organized criminal networks through Nettl, Putnam, Ekeh and Hyden. 
 
JSS Mill gives us the basic comparative tools to achieve an adequate level of comparative 
analysis. Through method of agreement we will try to procure a set of factors that seems to be 
connected in other forms of organized crime than the Nigerian type. After establishing this 
given set of factors we will compare these against indicators describing the Nigerian form. 
Through the method of difference we will then try to isolate the particular factors setting the 
Nigerian brand aside from other forms of organized crime. We will then try to find plausible 
causal explanations to why these particular factors have occurred in the first place. 
 
The chain of theoretic support is important to underline regarding the structure of 
methodology in this thesis. First of all Nettl establishes a foundation for discussing the 
inherent problems in the concept of state, and the particular fragmentation in place in third 
world countries. Nettl’s three perspectives shed a particular light on the fundamental problems 
of a Nigerian Federation. Putnam shows us the forms this fragmentation can take in his 
example in the divided Italy. Both of these authors build a foundation for Ekeh’s specific 
theory regarding the two publics in place in Africa and Nigeria. When we put these three 
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authors theory and case-specific problems together, we have a sound foundation under 
Hyden’s Economy of Affection, and strengthens it plausibility and causal significance for its 
use to analyse Nigerian Organized Criminal Networks.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
3. COMPARATIVE FORMS OF ORGANIZED CRIME 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will describe the more well known forms of organized crime to prepare for 
a possible comparative analysis against the Nigerian form. The best described is the Italian 
brand. A further supportive basis for the assumptions and conclusions made around the Italian 
brand of organized crime (OC) can be found in part 2.2 of the Thesis. We will also describe a 
selection of other types like the Chinese, Russian and Japanese. After describing these modes 
of organized crime we will attempt to find the common factors that can be found in all the 
abovementioned forms of OC. This will be done by using JSS Mill’s method of agreement 
described in part 2.3.2. Having established some common factors that explain some of the 
underlying mechanics forming organized crime, we will then attempt to draw up a chart of 
possible causal connections in the last part of this chapter. The theory used in describing the 
forms of organized crime will be divided between social network theory, trust- theory and an 
economic perspective to get a broader academic input on the cases. The chronological order 
of the chapter will follow social networks, Guanxi networks, trust-theory and an economic 
perspective because we are out to try explaining some of the mechanics behind other forms of 
Organized crime rather than the national-type of OC groups themselves. 
 
3.2. Organized crime: A social network approach. 
 
Within organized crime we find three major paradigms in modern criminology: the first 
assumes that organized crime is best understood as a functional organization, a reflection of 
institutional approaches of the 1960s, as well as the government hearings that gave the first 
glimpse into the organized crime world with the Kefauver and McClelland committees 
(Mcillwain1999: 303). The second discards the formality of the institutional approach and 
focuses on exchange relationship between those with power and those who need access to the 
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very same power. This paradigm originated during the 1970s. It is connected to the fields of 
anthropology and, in a smaller sense, political science that focuses on patron client 
relationships. The third paradigm, moves away from both the institutional approach and the 
exchange relationship perspective moving in the direction of the economic sciences 
established in the 1980s. This paradigm focuses on the business model of organized crime in 
itself, rather than the internal mechanics forming it (Ibidem).  
 
Mcillwain, in his article, proposes a common denominator for all three is human relationships; 
particular the human process of social networking (Mcillwain1999: 304). 
 
3.2.1. Social networking 
 
In the 1950s anthropologists found it necessary to find a further explanation to peoples social 
patterns in urban settings. Social organization could not be explained by economics, religion, 
politics, kinship etc. alone. Another common denominator was found; the very basic social 
level of formation of relationships. Looking at individual’s social role, status and position 
together with the inevitability of formation of relationships among these actors, one could 
conclude that the basic foundation of relationship-forming formed gateways to political and 
economic power for all involved. An important part of an actors tools of achieving his goals 
will therefore be the social network itself (Ibidem). 
 
Social networks can be explained as: 
 
“The relational structure of a group or larger social system consisting of the pattern of 
relationships among the collection of actors”  
(Mcillwain 1999:304-305) 
 
Actors and actions are therefore not singular objects, but inherently dependent on each other 
through linkage or relational ties, which in itself forms the channel of constraint and 
opportunity of individual action  (Mcillwain1999:305). We can hardly maintain the notion 
that social networks are exclusive to the upper society; it must also be manifested in the 
underworld in some degree. 
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3.2.2. Criminal networks, social networks 
 
Alan Block termed the view on organized crime as “The social system of organized crime” 
(Mcillwain1999: 307). He founded the idea on his historical research into the organized crime 
groups in New York city; 
 
“…Organized crime is a phenomenon recognizable by reciprocal services performed by 
professional criminals, politicians, and clients. Organized crime is thus understood to lie in 
the relationships binding members of the underworld to upperworld institutions and 
individuals…” Alan Block, 1994:10.  
 
Block also saw the loose connections that protected one of the three elements – criminal, 
clients or politicians – to be away from criminal conspiracy or some variant of corruption. 
Block used the term “organized criminality” to discern these specific cases. This allows a 
differentiation between the system in itself and the innumerable possibilities in such a system 
(Mcillwain1999: 307). 
 
3.2.3. Sicily; ethnicity and culture 
 
Ethnicity has always been an important aspect in the study of organized crime. When an 
discussion or analysis of organized crime takes place, it is always an issue to brand the subject 
with some ethnic pointer like “Russian” or “Italian” (Mcillwain1999: 308). Jay Albanese 
terms this construction as the ethnicity trap. This trap is sprung when organized crime is 
described “in terms of the nature of the groups that engage in it”, instead of the very substance 
of the organized crime itself. The question regarding how the substance or nature of the 
organized criminal groups influence the activity of the group itself, may be a good place to 
use social networking analysis as a tool to get an answer (Ibidem). Mcillwain here uses the 
theory of Anton Blok’s1 book “the Mafia of a Sicilian village, 1860 -1960” 1975. Blok living 
in a Sicilian village called Genuardo proposes an answer to the conditions that Mafiosi 
became a powerful force in the west Sicilian hinterlands (Mcillwain1999: 308).  
 
                                                 
1
 Not to be mixed with Alan Block 
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The private use of unlicensed violence is the core tool and means of control in the public 
arena: 
 
“The mafia supergang is a simplifying fiction, invented by publicists and by fascist officials 
charged with eliminating southern lawlessness. On the other hand, there really are Mafiosi – 
men wielding power through the systematic use of private violence. The sum of their actions 
makes up the phenomenon called mafia.”  
(Mcillwain1999: 309) 
 
Mcillwain therefore states that the Mafia depends on a certain set of connected economic and 
political factors. Who and where the mafia is, are then not the important question, but rather 
the connections between private violence and the political-economic life (Mcillwain1999: 
309). The connections between Mafiosi, landlords, bandits, peasants and many other 
individuals, forms the horizon which the Mafia is constrained in action. These 
interdependencies cannot be disassociated from the individuals forming them. Instead of 
freezing the villages sociological context in a specific point in time, one tries to use a broader 
historical axis to better point out the specific factors underlying the Mafia concept, and 
therefore look at the long-term process of origin and waning from the village, the growing 
impact of economic factors, the increase of population, the proletarization of large sectors of 
the peasantry, upward and downward social movement, urbanization, diaspora and state 
formation. (Mcillwain1999: 310-311).   
 
One result of historical analysis is the notion of the Mafiosi as a “political middleman” 
(Mcillwain1999:311). He concludes that the Mafiosi differ in at least two aspects; they exploit 
the loose couplings between the rural community and society rather then stop the pipelines of 
information. They exploit these venues of communication, and block other attempts at making 
the same connections. Secondly, the Mafiosi use threat and violence to cement their position 
(Ibidem). This allows them to serve as brokers of information and services between the 
various community groups and other groups at the Italian national level. In other words, the 
mafia inserts itself into the strata of society as a broker of information, defending this position 
through means of violence and powerbroking (Ibidem). 
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3.2.4. From nations to globalism 
 
It would be problematic to say the least to suggest that only Western society was home to the 
fabric of social networks.  One constant hypothesis regarding the dynamic relationship 
between the state and organized crime is that the level of strength and penetration of the state 
institutions will determine the level of organized crime. A weak state opens for alternative 
systems of power, or a local organization of society that stands on the outside of the state 
(Sung 2004:112, Gambetta 1996:4, Rabasa and Chalk 2001:(1, 65), Varese 1997:594, 
Bandiera 2003:222). However in the contemporary context, the global arena of transnational 
crime becomes more and more important because of another power-vacuum; the process of 
globalization. The very same networks of communication coupled with an increasing level of 
international trade, communication and travel gives the organized crime a new dimension to 
revel in. The global arena is somewhat new1, but most importantly not set under a single 
constricting set of rules or scrutiny by any single global institution. The global arena still 
works as a conglomerate of nation actors that constantly brokers for position and power. Just 
as the mafia in a Sicilian village puts itself into particular channels of communication and 
exploits these, the very same channels are ready for the taking on the global arena in a 
vacuum of global power (Myers 1996:182).  
 
3.2.5. Global social networks 
 
Social networking goes hand in hand with the understanding of cultures codes and norms, 
therefore building up a mutual trust that is needed in a criminal franchise 
(Mcillwain1999:316-317). Cross-cultured criminal networks are also a viable model. The 
Cairo based Zakarian organisation of the late-1920s is an example of this. An organisation 
that changed and intermingled cultures with a diversity spanning French, Austrian, Egyptian, 
Israeli, Palestinian, Armenian, Polish and Swiss (Mcillwain1999:317).  
 
Another example could be the U.S. senates subcommittee on Investigations scrutinized the 
role of organized crime on the international drug trade. They found a network spanning 400 
actors: 
 
                                                 
1
 At least as academic concept 
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“Marseilles (20), Le Havre (4), Paris (21), Milan (8), Genoa (2), Naples (4), Rome (4), Sicily 
(23), Turkey (13), Beirut(11), Montreal (25), Toronto (10), Buffalo (8), Boston (9), New York 
City(86), Connecticut (6), Philadelphia/Camden (4), Baltimore (3), Washington, 
D.C./Fairfax County (9), Miami (12), Atlanta (4), New Orleans (6), St. Louis 
(3), Cleveland (5), Detroit (6), Chicago (36), Omaha (3), Kansas City (11), 
Tulsa (1), Dallas (5), Houston (8), Brownsville (1), San Antonio (1), El Paso 
(1), Denver (4), Seattle (4), Portland (4), San Francisco (15) and Los Angeles(13).” 
(Mcillwain1999:318-319). 
 
What social dynamic could contrive to bring such a broad expanse of cultures together in a 
trust-dominated franchise like organized crime? Spanning roles like producers, refiners, 
importers, exporters and enforcers tied together in an complex web of relational ties further 
based in an extensive social system of organized crime (Mcillwain1999:319) 
 
3.2.6. Concluding on Mcillwains social networks 
 
Mcillwain agrees that patron-client relations perspective and the formation of informal and 
formal criminal organization, are useful tools in the analytics of organized crime or criminal 
networks. He however implies that the social networking perspective may be a more fruitful 
lens to view and understand the phenomenon Human relations form the least common 
denominator of organized crime (Ibidem). Social networking becomes the cornerstone in the 
dynamics of contriving to achieve resource through criminal means. The network spans the 
“upperworld” and “underworld” arenas, and put both official and criminal elements together 
in a mutual pursue of financial benefit through illegal means. The networks are never static, 
but change constantly, adapting and expanding due to internal and external pressure or 
change. The networks appear in different dynamics and postures in different cultures. Time 
and space are also spanned by the networks, giving the means to work the criminal methods in 
a global sphere (Mcillwain1999:319-320). 
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3.3. The Guanxi connection 
 
The peoples republic of China do not appear to be a weak state, however the Chinese 
organized crime groups may be the most potent organization on the global arena (Myers 
1996:183). Some estimates over the fiscal scale on Chinese organized criminal networks, 
through the traditional Guanxi networks1, show an economic turnover around $320 billion 
dollars per annum (Ibidem). This is probably unparalleled in the global organized crime arena 
today. Why are the Chinese criminal networks so dominating globally and financially when at 
the same time origins from a seemingly strong state? Evidence even suggests that the Russian 
Mafia and Colombian cartels have used the Chinese global transportation and distribution 
networks (Myers 1996:185). There are 3 factors that possibly constitute the fundament of 
Chinese organized crime; firstly the guanxi networks and the social implications this implies 
itself, second the history of Chinese migration and diaspora together with the trade networks 
this has created, finally the recent development in globalizational economics and the 
problematic relation to Taiwan. 
 
3.3.1. Guanxi networks 
 
Chinese are brought up in a hierarchically based society that emphasizes the importance of the 
network or connections to other people instead of using the individual as the smallest 
common denominator. The network functions as an ever-expanding web of relations 
consisting of mutual obligate bonds of varying strength (Ibidem). The Chinese term for this 
concept is Guanxi, which is built on inter-personal relationships that are naturally present and 
others must be acquired, maintained and built upon. The dynamics of this bond is then placed 
between the favor that is carried out by either party (renquing) and the repayment for this 
favor (bao), these two factors must then be balanced. The favors rendered do not alone signify 
the entire dynamic. The strength and size of each interacting persons guanxi-network also 
plays into the dynamic, giving a total picture for each actor to what he may pay and what he 
may get back from the transaction. All these considerations will then tell an actor if the bond 
of guanxi will be mutually beneficial or not (Myers 1996:185-186). 
  
                                                 
1
 An ancient form of Chinese social networking, also manifested globally today.  
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3.3.2. Guanxi origins 
 
One plausible reason for informal networks dominating the Chinese cultural sphere in an 
apparent strong state context is the communist centralized government largely recent 
appearance through the Republic of China in 1912, and most important the social state of 
China in 1949. Guanxi networks seem to only in part to have been exacerbated by the 
centralized government, and in some instances involving senior officials not at all (Myers 
1996:190). 
 
The family is the nexus and origin of the guanxi. In Chinese families all resources are shared 
according to needs. Each family’s individual is therefore required to contribute to the shared 
pool in his or her means, and given back according to need (Myers 1996:186). For example, 
when one family member gets to old to contribute, the male children take on the burden of 
supporting them. The inherent strength of these family bonds gives us an understanding why 
Chinese criminal networks emulate these (Ibidem). Guangdong and Fujian, southeast China, 
is the origin of the bulk of the Chinese global diaspora. Single surname-villages and lineage 
villages are common, making a powerful incentive for Global Guanxi relations (Ibidem). 
 
Western influence does not seem to displace or change the workings of the Guanxi, but 
instead seems adamant in its structure and functionality. This also gives an insight into the 
deep-rootedness of the Guanxi networks, and the power of influence it has had over Chinese 
society through times (Myers 1996:187). One apparent difference between the east west 
spheres in this regard is the position of the rule of law. In the west, the rule of law is the very 
arbiter between individuals in most conflict situations, maybe even a fundamental expression 
of moral values. In China the Guanxi network among, other factors, serves as the same 
arbiter, marginalizing the legal system, and even influencing its decisions in ways that in the 
west would be looked upon as a corruption of the legal system (Myers 1996:188). This 
Chinese dynamic between the legal sphere and the informal sphere blurs the boarders between 
what is criminal and what is legal (Ibidem). For example if a criminal group provides 
resources not otherwise obtainable they become institutionalized into society. Further, in the 
Global arena, the state may utilize criminal networks as a cover for maintaining national 
interests abroad (Ibidem). 
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To draw a broad sketch of the Guanxi networks level of involvement one may look at it as a 
nexus that permeates the family, social, commercial, governmental, military or criminal in 
mutual bonds of trust and service. As such, tongs, lineage, guilds, associations, partnerships 
and conspiracies are constant in social, commercial, familial and criminal context (Ibidem).  
 
The Guanxi effect is also a stabilizing factor between diaspora criminal groups and Chinese 
based groups, serving as a line of communication and equalizer between these that in a 
western law perspective should be in a competitive stance against each other. This is the main 
factor why Chinese criminal networks are potentially the greatest threat to global security and 
law enforcement. The Russian, Colombian, Italian organized criminal groups are all 
splintered in competition through different cartels and groupings, making it easier for law 
enforcements to suppress these threats than the Chinese (Myers 1996:189).  
 
3.3.3. The Chinese diaspora 
 
The Chinese ethnic groups is one of the most widely spread groups today, if not the most 
(Ibidem). There are 55 million based in most countries, with a GNP close to $450 billion. The 
great dispersal took place in the colonial times that divided China, and as mentioned before, 
the majority of these migrants came from Chinas south coast; Fujian and Guangdong  
(Ibidem).  
 
Fujian, which is one of the smaller Han-provinces the size of Nicuragua, has historically 
strong ties with the seas and international trade through times (Myers 1996: 189-190). 
Contrary to the long separation between the overseas Fukinese and their ancestral kin on 
mainland China, the ties are powerful and unbroken to this day (Myers 1996:190). Under the 
cultural revolution, areas with such ties where singled out for an especial harsh treatment and 
confiscation of resource. This led for example to the migration of the people who formed the 
14k triad1 in Hong Kong (Ibidem). 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The 14k Triad group is based in Hong Kong but active internationally. It is the second largest Triad group in 
the world with around 20,000 members split into thirty subgroups (Gastrow 2003, Chu 1997). 
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The Cantonese from the Guangdong province went or were transported around the world 
(Myers 1996:191). While the Fukinese dominate the southeast Asian sphere, the Cantonese 
and Yun speaking Chinese dominate United States and Canada. They were forced by law and 
circumstance to live in closed societies1 working in mines and railroad construction later to 
become entrepreneurs much like the Fukinese in Southeast Asia (Ibidem). 
 
The same patterns of discrimination and geographical enclosure that riddled both ethnic 
groups lead to a general practice of Guanxi by the overseas Chinese as the tool to obtain 
access to resource in a vertically structured society (Myers 1996:192). With this practice came 
the same bonds of mutual obligation, marginalization of the legal sphere, and the connection 
between the legal and illegal dimension. Through recent events the pattern and implication of 
the global Guanxi network is formed: 
 
“With the joinder of these globally distributed Chinese societies and the replacement of 
political barriers with open trade, investment and communication, the opportunistic criminal 
groups institutionalized within each individual society possessed the conditions necessary to 
become transnational in scope and to engage in activities requiring globally distributed 
resources.” (Myers 1996:193) 
 
3.3.4. Hei Shehui 
 
Roughly translated, Hei Shehui means “Black Society”. It is generally applied to the groups 
or people that operate in the obscure line between legal and illegal. One may divide these 
groups into two main categories according to focus and nature. Some groups/networks may of 
course be involved in activities at the same time on a local, regional and global scale. 
The first category involves groups that mainly criminal activity such as: manufacture, 
distribution and sale of drugs, kidnapping and sale of women and children for the sex trade, 
extortion, armed robbery, and contract murder (Myers 1996:193). The second category is the 
economic gangs which involve themselves in the monetary exchange market, goods and 
services through the tool of public corruption. Within and working across these categories are 
                                                 
1
 The cultural and symbolic concept of  ”China Towns” in the USA. 
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the Triads. Triads may be defined as connections within large or small Guanxi networks, and 
the convergence of these (Ibidem). 
 
3.3.5. Concluding on Myers 
 
While the very numbers being thrown around can be questioned, and scales on organized 
crime that lack any solid basis but approximations, the very notion around Guanxi networks 
are an interesting factor to connect to Mcillwains hypothesis, which he does in his 1999 
article. Putting numbers and quantification aside, the important part the Guanxi networks 
plays, both as lines of communication and premise for mutual obligation, fits the picture when 
one tries to see some of the fundamental dynamics of organized crime. We also perhaps have 
to dispel the notion that the Chinese socialist state is a strong one taking into account the 
arguments around corruption and the way Guanxi networks permeates the government 
administration. Perhaps China suffers from the same symptoms the Soviet state did. The old 
feudal structures were co-opted into the new structures forming the central party, which 
appeared as a new form of nobility, de facto changing society’s power structure in a limited 
way. 
  
3.4. Public distrust: Mafia 
 
3.4.1. Origins of Mafia 
 
“In addition, the mafia is exemplary of those cases where the public interest lies in collapsing 
rather than building internal trust and cooperation.” 
(Gambetta 2000:158). 
 
In the Italian period of the 16th and 17th century the Habsburg Spanish dominion exerted a 
“divide and conquer” policy involving marginalizing commerce and production, manipulation 
of information, igniting religious superstition and establishing vertical bonds of submission 
and exploitation (Ibidem.)  The destruction of legal principles of equality and overturning the 
relationships between sexes may be viewed as a concerted promotion of distrust (Gambetta 
2000:158-159). 
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If the former Aragonese rule should be viewed as a more trust-based or ideal, is questionable. 
Alexis de Toqueville1 journey from Naples to Sicily sketches an apparent adjustment instead 
of rebellion against the system of Habsburg-Spain (Gambetta 2000:159). 
The Bourbon Spanish period from 1724 to the unification of Italy in 1861 continued in the 
same tracks as the Habsburg regime, fostering a split between the Sicilians and Neapolitans. 
Why this system prevailed in a hybrid form so long afterwards is difficult to ascertain, 
however its interesting to note that only 11 years after Toquevilles partial narrative is written 
an official report mentions for the first time the term “Mafia” as an established social force  
(Gambetta 2000:160). A Tuscan landowner, Leopoldo Franchetti, implies in a political 
administrative analysis in 1876, that the mafia in the 19th century has characteristics that 
reminds strongly of the dynamics of the mafia today, and implies the same patterns spanning 
over 100 years (Ibidem). He identifies two main sets of factors for the formation of the mafia: 
 
“The first is eminently political and has to do with the absence of credible or effective 
systems of justice and law enforcement. From at least the time of the sixteenth century 
(Cancila 1984), Sicilians were able to trust neither the fairness nor the protection of the law. 
This pre-existing state of affairs caused considerable difficulties to the newly formed Italian 
state, which, in spite of its weakness and its mistakes, might otherwise have claimed the right 
to a far higher degree of legitimation than any of the previous regimes..” 
(Gambetta 2000:160) 
 
The second set focuses on economic instead of political trust. The distrust of the state, with its 
involvement in economic affairs, achieves to close of the vent that private entrepreneurship 
may produce (Gambetta 2000:161). A possible third factor in play may be the opportunities in 
social mobility. 
 
The public perception of the mafia maintains the view that the Mafiosi gives out the very 
same order and justice that the Spanish eroded (Ibidem). The mafia also focuses in the 
premise of exclusivity; the term “Cosa Nostra” means “our thing” not yours. The 
enforcements on monopolies and tolerate no competition and insert themselves into segments 
of society that most easily are open for the opportunity of monopolization like land, cattle, 
                                                 
1
 Alexis-Charles-Henri Clérel de Tocqueville (1805-1859) 
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sources of water in dry land, markets, auctions, ports, building, transport, and public works. 
(Gambetta 2000:162).  
 
The very action that is most commonly associated to the mafia is enforcements of monopolies 
of legal goods through violence. The boundary between protection from real or fictitious 
threats is a blurred and undefined one, as such it is difficult to put ones finger on the actions 
as purely criminal, but rather in between in a grey zone (Ibidem).  
 
The mafia is far from a rural concept. The urban sphere has also been the arena of mafia-
based criminal activity.  In this bourgeoisie setting, the line between private and public 
interest becomes unclear, and the middle class find themselves in close connection to the 
criminal element, and favours or services are exchanged (Ibidem). 
 
The formation of a formal mafia organization is a recent event, but originally the connections 
were probably uncertain and erratic between monopolies, which at times were in conflict to 
each other, ignored the other mafia-groups or cooperated. The limitation to the monopoly in 
itself was another, equally or more strong or determined. One reason for a more strongly 
organized mafia-system is probably the effects of competition pushing out the smaller and 
weaker monopolies, leading to a more strongly organized and widespread mafia. Even though 
these organizations have achieved a higher level of streamlined franchise, it has never reached 
a stage of healthy cooperation over longer period of time (Ibidem). No single super-monopoly 
has been formed, nor has the mafia dissolved wholesale, but only sustained a chaotic balance 
of force (Gambetta 2000:163). 
 
The inherent tool of the mafia is then of the concept trust, or rather the apparent guile of trust 
in a background of distrust. Trust in mafia-systems then seems fruitful for the individual but 
in a collective scale becomes a negative factor when looking at the society as a whole. The 
trust becomes a commodity of scarcity because as one trust a given set of people, the distrust 
of others is subtracted in the mafia-based system of trust-relations (Ibidem). 
 
The mechanisms that have sustained the mafia over longer periods of time are both intended 
and unintended. The latter involves the context of a legitimate authority that is not there. In 
such a context, the choice of the individual when trying to stay out of the mafia-system is 
limited to lying low or migrating all together, forming a further background of distrust. As 
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mafia opposed individuals depart the scene, the strength of the mafia grows further. This 
effect is undoubtedly unintended, because the mafia-individuals goals when they depart, is 
surely not to enforce the mafia’s strength (Ibidem). 
 
Another more partially unintentional factor, is the democratic state in itself, which is of course 
hostile to such an alternative power to itself, the mafia sustains itself in such a system by 
mobilizing votes. One possible way to break the mafia-system is to deliver a stable economic 
arena of credit and produce, this is however utopian in an economic setting based on 
monopolies (Gambetta 2000: 163-164). 
 
The example of the authoritarian South Korean rule that would not allow local monopolies to 
exist could be compared to the fascist period of Italy. Simply put, a bigger and more 
independent mafia that marginalizes the smaller. In contrast democracy has to rely on 
consensus to rule. One effect of this period could be the further distrust of centralized 
governments suddenly poaching in on the local arena. Connecting this with the rise of 
democracy, the majority of Italians could agree that it was at least better with mafia than 
fascism. At any level the attempts at dissolving the mafia is therefore caught between two 
opposing poles, that of using too little force, or too much, and by that limiting civil liberties 
(Gambetta 2000:164).  
 
3.4.2. Cooperation or distrust 
 
“The mechanisms which motivate cooperation in any form of human endeavour, as Bernard 
Williams explains elsewhere in this volume, comprise four basic elements: coercion, interests, 
values, and personal bonds. People, that is, may decide to cooperate (1) for fear of sanctions; 
(2) because cooperation enhances their mutual economic interests; (3) because they have 
general reasons, whether cultural, moral or religious, to believe that cooperation is good 
irrespective of sanctions and rewards; and finally (4) because they are related to one another 
by bonds of kin or friendship.” (Gambetta 2000:164) 
 
The mafia learnt their lesson well and use all four elements in their criminal and semi-
criminal systems (Ibidem). 
 
 49 
Gambetta limits himself to the first to elements in his article: coercion and mutual economic 
interest.  
 
“It so happens that a person who would be prepared to make very great sacrifices in order to 
stop the domination of violence, is compelled to support it, strengthen it and associate with 
it . … He cannot think to resort to the law, because the probability of being shot for those 
who do so is far too high for him to expose himself lightly … External circumstances 
impose themselves on everyone, irrespective of the inclinations of his mind (Franchetti 
1974: 106-7).” (Gambetta 2000: 165) 
 
The opportunity in using violence direct or perceived, is a form of mafia behaviour that is 
well known. It may be the very factor that splinters the mafia from other similar quasi-
criminal systems, using it outside to take care of “business” and inside to keep the level of 
disruption and disloyalty at a minimum. The very act of violence does not have to go any 
further than an initial act, as the very reputation or “basta la fama”, sustains the criminal 
onwards as a perceived threat by posturing as a violent actor (Ibidem). 
 
The connection between violence and other mechanisms suitable for inducing cooperation is 
threefold.  Firstly the very factors that can be substituted by violence, or traded for violence; 
(1) values – larger quantities of “omerta1” ensure lesser ones for violence; (2) interests – 
which can be cultivated by cooperation and take away the need for violence; (3) personal 
bonds – relatives and friends are more likely to cooperate and takes away some demands on 
violence to keep them under control. The relationship of mutual reinforcement: greater levels 
of “omerta” take away the risk in using violence, strengthening both omerta and the ability to 
use violence in a reinforcing spiral. Also, when higher levels of violence is expected, the more 
likely “omerta” will be followed to the point where the “omerta” becomes unclear if it is 
followed in faith or fear. At the same time, fulfilling common economic interests are 
connected to the level of possible violence which can be distributed, therefore strengthening 
the coopting economic bonds at the same time (Ibidem). 
 
                                                 
1
 Roughly translated as ”code of silence”, (Gardaphe, 1997) 
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There is also a third contradictory relationship between coercion and cooperation. When 
levels of violence gets to high, while still imposing paranoia in some, others who are the 
recipients of a saturated level of violence, can lead to revenge and a total breach of “omerta”. 
One case could be that of Tommaso Buscetta, who in 1983, decided to give all information he 
had on the mafia-system, after half his family was murdered. His confession led to a trial of 
nearly 500 persons (Ibidem). 
 
Violence in itself will therefore never be enough to sustain a mafia-based criminal system or 
organization. Explaining the mafia through that factor alone is unsatisfactory (Gambetta 
2000:165-166). Cooperation must be based on further sets of factors, for example economic 
interests. The connections between the mafia-systems and the public sphere are broad: 
corruption of civil servants, exchange of favours for electoral support or the handling of 
labour disputes for the benefit of entrepreneurs and landowners. But they may also be remote 
and form lose couplings to the core of the violence-based mafia system; when private citizens 
are offered good terms for interest rates to invest in informal banking systems in a 
information-weak context. Thus the complexity of the mafia network spans the direct violence 
connected crime to rational opportunities for private citizens (Gambetta 2000:166). 
 
3.4.3. The importance of trust-relations 
 
The role of the “victim” also becomes unclear as some benefits can be discerned in the mafia 
– citizen relationship. Even as an individual suffer extortion or other non-benefactory 
conditions in a mafia system, he may get advantages through the mafias handling of 
information. As a “friend” of the mafia in an economic-market sphere with low capacity for 
information, the risk for being cheated in business deals lowers. The absence of information 
in a business field diminish the level of trust between actors, seriously hampering level of 
produce and exchange in the market. The mafia is then a possible solution for the market to 
meet some of the actor’s expectations: 
 
“I bought a dead horse who does not know his way around, wants to follow only the roads he 
likes, slips and falls on slopes, fears squibs and bells, and yesterday he fledged and crashed 
into a flock of sheep that was barring the way. A camorrista [the Neapolitan version of a 
mafioso] who protects me and used to control the horse market, would have spared me from 
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this theft. He used to check on the sales and get his tip from both buyers and sellers. Last year 
I wanted to get rid of a blind horse and he helped me to sell it as a good one, for he protected 
me. Now he is in jail and I was forced to buy this bad horse without him. He was a great 
gentleman! (quoted by Monnier [1863]1965: 73-4)” (Gambetta 2000:166). 
 
In the absence of the mafia-connection the coachman’s business suffers, as he is literary 
saddled with a bad horse. It is interesting to see the role of the Mafioso in this particular 
context as his position as a guarantor the exchange would probably never take place at all. In 
a situation with only these three actors; Mafioso, seller and buyer, paradoxically the 
transaction would leave every party better off. There is however rarely only one seller in a 
market, and the Mafioso picks out a particular set of vendors for his guarantee. Why does not 
the Mafioso extend his guarantee and connections of trust to every vendor on the market? One 
probable reason may be that the Mafioso then becomes much more visible to the public 
scrutiny, making him more vulnerable and breaking some of the tenets of the omerta. The 
implications of the select few who benefits from the mafia connections does have a 
detrimental effect on the market as actor need to put more time on finding possible mafia-
connections or even become a mafia-cluster by themselves (Gambetta 2000:166-167). 
 
3.4.4. Concluding on trust 
 
The instance with the coachman and his horse may give us the picture to draw the assumption 
that a subtle message from the mafia is also at play. Whoever is not under the mafia’s 
protection is in risk of getting bad deals. The Mafioso can then be said to have an interesting 
in regulated injections of distrust into the market to foster a demand for the very product he 
sells: protection. If actors could trust each other contrary to the mafia’s involvement the 
middleman role of the mafia would be superfluous. The context of distrust is then the mafia’s 
biosphere in which they thrive (Gambetta 2000:167).  
 
Thus injecting and fermenting distrust is the very factor that has empowered the Italian mafia 
over such lengths of time. Pushing aside why distrust is generated, as soon as it comes into 
play, every buyer in the market seeks ways and opportunities to get past it, and riding away on 
a good horse instead of a bad one. The seller then priorities selling the horse, and even better: 
selling a bad one. To seek connections to the Mafioso and by that getting clear of distrust can 
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then hardly be called an irrational action. The implications of such a system is however 
severe: high murder rates, higher costs of transactions, lower levels of technological 
innovation other than “military” innovation, migration of the best human capital, higher rates 
of cheating, low quality of goods and services, and this concoction of distrust and trust-based 
mafia brokering is the reason why southern Italy has been kept the way it is (Gambetta 
2000:167). 
 
3.5. The economic view: mafia through land reform 
 
“The mafia is, essentially, nothing but the expression of a need for order, for the control of a 
State.” Giovanni Falcone 
(Bandiera 2003:218) 
 
The Sicilian mafia seems to have merged in during the 19th century in period of predatory 
attacks on private property together with the lack of public security. The mafia then sold what 
the state could not provide: Protection and enforcement of property rights. One of the more 
important events taking place before the emergence of the mafia was the termination of 
feudalism and the splintering of large feudal estates that lead to the establishment of modern 
property rights and a vast increase of landholders (Bandiera 2003:219). 
 
When the expansion of actors in the land and agricultural sphere increased, the opportunities 
for a mafia-system rose exponentially; 
 
“The theoretical argument rests on the fact that protection involves an externality, because by 
buying protection, each landowner deflects thieves on others’ properties. For each landlord, 
protection is therefore more valuable if he is one of the few to receive it, which implies that 
each landlord is willing to pay more if only a few receive protection. As the number of 
landlords increases, there are more landlords who would pay to keep some out, which 
imply that the surplus received by the mafia increases with the degree of land fragmentation.” 
(Bandiera 2003:219) 
 
Even though the very product (agricultural land) that is the basis for protection is unchanged, 
the competition rises steadily as more landowners seek to protect their particular interest. By 
seeking protection for their assets, the thieves are further pushed into new unguarded land 
 53 
parcels, creating a steady rise in demand for protection. The mafia will also leave “open” 
some possibilities of exploitation of the lands they protect, and by that not deliver a “total” 
security to their clients. As such the landowners get stuck in a classical prisoners dilemma, 
were everybody would be better off if no one sought protection in the first place, and yet 
seeking protection was the common solution for most landowners (Bandiera 2003:220). 
 
Land protection is of course only one of the schemes of the mafia. Cartel protection (a 
relevant example could be protection of miller cartels) is an activity that has been enforced 
steadily from the mafia’s origins to this day (Bandiera 2003:219-220).  
 
3.5.1. Russian mafia and yakuza comparisons 
 
The yakuza probably developed in post-feudal Japan, which just as Russia and Sicily had a 
dramatic increase in private property rights not followed by a strengthening of the states 
security capacity to enforce such a expansion of property rights. This is also discussed in the 
article by Millhaupt and West (Millhaupt 2000: 44-46), and Varese (Varese 2001: 188-189). 
And as in other similar instances, there were groups of hoodlums and unemployed samurai 
capable of supplying the vacuum of security (Bandiera 2003:221). 
 
Even today, the states lack of proper security in some instances lead the yakuza to provide 
enforcement in categories such as; dispute mediation, real estate forclosure, corporate 
monitoring, lending, and crime control. Millhaupt and west made a data collection to try to 
show the strength of their hypothesis. Their result may indicate that through 25 years, yakuza 
membership is negatively related to the quantity of civil cases filed in district court, thus 
giving some strength to the hypothesis of the yakuza providing some substitute for state 
enforcement (Bandiera 2003:221-222) 
 
The Russian mafia probably started during the transition from a planned communist economy 
to a free market structure according to Varese (Varese 2001:186-188). Institutional reforms 
created a diffusion of private property without the state providing the necessary follow up 
security capacity, thus creating a strong demand for private security. Much like the Sicilian 
feudal guards, ex-KGB officers and unemployed soldiers were available and in position to 
meet such demands. A survey form 2001 shows the general acceptance by Russian 
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shopkeeper that protection rackets are substitutes for the lack of proper policing (Bandiera 
2003:222). 
 
3.5.2. What is the difference between a state and a mafia? 
 
“Without love and justice, governments become a magnum latrocinium – a band of robbers 
(Mans 1962: 95; De Civitate Dei IV.4). For Augustine justice is the essence of the State, and 
the essence of justice is the amor Dei.” (Dreyer 2005: 885). 
 
 Considering that the mafia had a monopoly on violence and its origins stems from the 
franchise of private property protection, the analysis of the start of the mafia resonates with 
the origins of state, how many positive comparisons could be made? Two key issues should 
be scrutinized in view of the question; the origins of the state and the start of the mafia differs 
in one important factor. Firstly, the state is linked to the origins of the rights the very same 
state is meant to enforce. The mafia, on the other hand developed to enforce already existing 
rights simplifies the comparison. Secondly, in recent literature, most assumptions point to the 
direction that the mafia will always try to maximize its own welfare. One can then probably 
rightly assume that the stability of such regimes is a more beneficial solution than anarchy 
(Bandiera 2003:222). 
 
“Rulers negotiate contracts with their agents and constituents and each set of actors attempts 
to attain the best possible terms. Contracts are possible only if they make each party better 
off” (Bandiera 2003:222). 
 
Economic literature has a similar direction. In his text Bandiera mentions Grossman who try 
to provide a justification why society may prefer protection from a “king” to decentralized 
protection, even if the king is a “predatory” one. Through a model of general equilibrium, in 
which the predators success depends on the total resources used for protection. Individual 
producers do not then internalize this positive externality, but the king will. Bandiera argues 
that a predatory king will provide public goods that increase national output, if he in the long 
term will benefit from an increase in general production and more revenue. The thesis of 
Bandiera however shows us that a predatory regime, like the mafia, can emerge and sustain 
itself even though all actors would be better of in an anarchy. By getting protection, each 
agent ignores the negative externality he pushes on to others, and they cannot coordinate to 
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play the Pareto-superiour equilibrium. Landlords face the standard prisoners dilemma, 
everyone would be better off if nobody hired the mafia for protection (Bandiera 2003: 222-
223). 
 
Game mechanics looking at group dynamics can also contribute to the analysis of the mafia. 
Firstly comes the balance of benefits. There is a stronger likelihood of one member of a 
smaller group to be privileged, where this member seeks cooperation as its most important 
strategy and by this delivers a public good (which could for example be an army enforcing 
security, substituting the mafia). Punishment schemes are the second important factor. 
Enforcing sanctions in a small group of actors is difficult when the actors will probably 
receive a larger “dose” of sanctions and at the same time have an easier opportunity to 
communicate and cooperate. Large groups will on the other hand have problems 
communicating since the costs will be greater, and the sanctions probably will be more 
distributed evenly over a larger selection of recipients of sanctions, thereby making the 
frequenz of sanctions for each actor lower (Bandiera 2003:223).  
 
In Bandieras example with the mafia, group size matters because of the very specific nature of 
the protection. It determines the equilibrium price the landlords are willing to pay for 
protection. As such, group size’s effects and other variables are not the important factor, but 
rather the intrinsic value of the group size itself (Bandiera 2003:224). 
 
3.5.3. Concluding on the economic view 
 
The mafia was created by the institutional change from feudalism to the establishment of 
private property rights, and the parcelling and splintering of the larger estates. It found its 
place in the vacuum of security where predatory attacks where frequent. The mafia groups 
then gain legitimacy, power and reputation from the services they provide, and through 
innovation find other illegal niches to exploit further on. It is interesting to note the 
similarities in the emergence of the Russian and Japanese mafias. To understand the role of 
mafias in the crevices of society is important to devise effective policies, both in prevention 
and facing the mafia directly (Bandiera 2003:239-240). Judge Giovanni Falcone, devoted 
opponent of the mafia once aptly gave an insight into his thoughts of the mafia-system: 
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“Sicily is a land where unfortunately the structures of the State are very deficient. The mafia 
has worked out how to fill this void in its own way …. On exchange for the services it has 
offered (in its own interest of course) it has continued to increase its own power. To deny this 
reality only makes the fight more difficult. (Falcone, 1991)” (Bandiera 2003: 240). 
 
3.6. Finding the connective factors 
 
3.6.1. Criminal networks or organized crime? 
 
When trying to come to terms with the nuances of these slightly different definitions, one can 
perhaps vaguely perceive a division between the underlying terms in criminal networks and 
organized crime, where for example we could use criminal networks as a definition 
explaining criminal conspiracy without a clear nexus of power or administration, while 
organized crime seems to be more hierarchical and top-down oriented. One problem 
immediately arises if we agree to both of the definitions; that the definitions are widely 
different from article to article when looking at the literature in general. Frank Hagan tries, in 
an attempt to come to grips with the varying definitions of organized crime, to air some 
complementary definitions that may perhaps be a better candidate for the task. Spanning from 
avocational crime, corporate crime, economic crime, elite crime, elite deviance, occupational 
crime, organizational crime, professional crime, upperworld crime, or white collar deviance 
his suggestions are as varied as the definitions of organized crime (Hagan 2006:128). The 
definitions are however all too specific, narrowing the playing field so far down that many 
forms of criminal activities that shows clear signs of being part of the same problem is left on 
the outside. Most important is the fact that all of these definitions rules out the prime factor 
that Alan Block (Block 1994:239-240) advocates as a “concept of organized crime”; the 
connection between upperworld and underworld agents in a criminal franchise. There are of 
course many lines of arguments and opinions that differs from Block, but his general but still 
very specific definition shows us what I also concur as the most important connection and 
basic element that gives an indicator regarding organized crime (and criminal networks as I 
will explain in the following text). For me the connection between agents on the official or 
“upperside” and the criminal or “downside” of society, can vary from an official turning a 
“blind eye” or actively participating in some sort of crime, but he must be a partner in some 
degree, either silent or vocal. 
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My solution will therefore be to put the term organized crime in Blocks definition as the 
concept that stands above both the definition of criminal networks and organized crime. When 
I use both these definitions Block’s concept is still in play as an absolute, connected to both 
terms. The terms in this thesis is rather a further specification of Block’s concept; if the 
concept of Block is connected to a loosely based network without a clear nexus, it will be 
defined as a criminal network. If the concept is connected to a criminal administration 
showing some degree of centralized leadership, it will be defined as organized crime. The 
bottom line is Block’s concept being the important definition that overrules both the specifics 
of organized crime and criminal networks, and the foundation for dividing these two from 
general mundane crime. A general description of his concept will therefore be organized 
criminal networks. 
 
To actually ascertain that an involvement between a criminal actor and an “official” actor has 
taken place is of course problematic. We therefore have to implement a large degree of slack 
regarding this factor. If direct evidence of “upper” and “lower” is not obtainable, we still have 
to accept instances of this being likely, but not proven in an empirical way. We must however 
underline the fact that this only seems likely, and no direct evidence of the issue has currently 
been found. 
 
3.6.2. Organized crime/criminal networks, comparative analysis framework. 
 
“From the very second that two people sat together round a fire in the forest, there was 
another human out there who felt better in the dark” 
Andrew Wachss1. 
 
As underlined in the initial metaphoric paraphrase, the red thread that runs through all 
arguments explaining this problem, is the power-vacuum that was left behind, in certain 
arenas, through mankinds civilizational progress. This absence of power can be traced to the 
failed or weak state that did not have the means to adequately penetrate the socioeconomic 
sphere with institutions of security. 
                                                 
1
 This citation from mr. Wachss is not in the thesis Reference part, as its only meant to convey a poetic metaphor 
rather than a scientific contribution. 
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This “hole” in security in a given society is an independent variable that stands as the very 
basis for any form of criminal network or organized crime entrepreneurship. The following 
factors being described are the very tools or dependent variables that are used to successfully 
exploit the very same “hole” or vacuum in a state’s socioeconomic arena;   
 
3.6.3. Social networks 
 
In the case of the Italian Mafioso we see an ethnical connected social network, partly created 
by a former imperial “divide and conquer” policy fragmenting the north – south sphere of 
Italy.   
 
The Russian social networks are perhaps singular in their process of first manifesting a level 
of organized crime only after co-opting into the black market of the 60s and 70s. A code of 
conduct seems to be a factor forming the Russian networks, but in a hybrid form after the 
collusion with the black economy sector. 
 
The Chinese networks are cemented into the basic block of family ties, expanding into lines 
of meeting interest with the family core as an anchor. Coupled together with the diaspora that 
stands as a factor alone, we see that the ties are strengthened in a context of multi-cultural 
society. 
 
The Japanese social networks are perhaps most similar to the Italian, giving us a clear 
connection between to different cultural and geographical spheres. That the land-reform factor 
has been a important part of the formation of both the Japanese and Italian organized criminal 
networks, is a good indicator that social network theory together with broad economic change 
is a significant factor, since the cultural values is divergent.  
 
Trust is the basic formula that works as a social contract between members of the criminal 
franchise and the prime motor in the social networks. It has to be a given that some level of 
trust exists in the Italian, Russian, Chinese and Japanese organized networks of crime. As 
trust comes into play, organized criminal networks will benefit from attempts to monopolize 
trust, thereby making attempts to sow distrust in social connections they are not a part of. 
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3.6.4. Economic collapse / economic change. 
 
The land reforms of Japan and Italia, the economic 180 degree turn in Russia, and the Chinese 
communist project have all been trigger factors in both creating the space for organized 
criminal networks and heralding the start of these organizations as full fledged criminal 
actors. This is also connected to the diaspora effect. Economic collapses especially can be 
seen as factors for larger diasporic events. However we have to take into account the special 
circumstances around Japan which do not seem to have any larger diasporas, or diasporas 
connected to Organized Crime. 
 
3.6.5. Global organized criminal networks; The diaspora. 
 
The diaspora effect as such can not be included as a general factor for organized criminal 
networks in itself. We can on the other hand include is as a general factor in Global organized 
criminal networks. Japan has historically and contemporary been an introverted society. Even 
today migration laws are severely restricted. No clear large economic collapse together with a 
diaspora can historically be found. If this is because of Japans’ culture for closing in on itself, 
is difficult to conclude on. We may however argument that it has at least played some part. 
 
Looking at the Chinese and Italian diasporas, we find a weak link back to their origins. 
Especially the Italian mafia in the United States. The American italian-ethnic organized 
criminal networks have largely functioned as american organizations, not Italian. However the 
more recent diaspora in Russia shows much clearer lines of communications back to their 
home country. It is hard to not include modern communications technology as a factor in this 
argument. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
Besides further cementing the point around the state level of weakness being imperative to the 
level of organized crime we have found three main factors colluding through method of 
agreement. We have established these main forms of complimentary factors through 
analysing the Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms of organized crime. Through the 
lenses of social network theory, trust-theory and an economic perspective, we have found the 
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following three analytic factors, which we must use in the next chapter looking on the 
Nigerian form of Organized Criminal Networks: 
 
1. Social networks 
How strong or weak are the social networks impact on organized criminal networks? 
 
2. Economic collapse/Economic change 
What impact did the oil-boom collapse have in Nigeria? 
 
3. Diaspora 
Which role does the Nigerian diaspora play in the organized criminal networks? 
 
These three main directions will form the basis for the coming analysis of Nigerian organized 
criminal networks. If we find discrepancies from the way these factors impact on Nigerian 
OCN’s from the forms of organized crime already described, we may have found singular 
indicators on how Nigerian OCN’s work through method of difference. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
4. NIGERIAN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
4.1.1. Nigerian organized crime or criminal networks? 
 
As discussed in part 3.6.1 the typological definitions regarding organized crime can be 
divided into a hierarchic based organized crime structure and a more loosely based criminal 
network definition, both coming under Alan Block’s definition of factors necessary to 
conclude that organized crime is in play. We will in this part of the chapter try to determine 
which category Nigerian organized crime broadly falls under. 
 
Nigerian organized criminal networks, are in the drug trade, based on well-established local 
trafficking networks that are either contracted by foreign operators for their logistical services 
or direct purchasement from foreign traffickers. The product is then distributed in the local 
market or shipped further on to other markets (Mazzitelli 2007:1075-1076). The networks 
appear to have evolved from local drug-trafficking entrepreneurs who began their franchise in 
the late 1980s and 1990s that developed from small subcontractors to large regional 
entrepreneurs. As the availability and scale of the trade escalated a new type of agents, the 
“freelancers”, appeared. These agents are both European citizens and West Africans with 
resident permits in Europe, who smuggle the product to their current European country 
(Mazzitelli 2007:1076).  
 
When it comes to trafficking of women for commercial sexual exploitation a recruiter and 
transporter, who’s goal is to access the prostitution markets of Europe, may spend about 
$2000 for bribing officials, get travel documents and safe houses, and the transportation itself 
to a “madam”, who pays approx. $12,000 for the victim. These networks appear to be well 
developed and involve themselves all the way from recruitment to the victims’ final 
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destination. Threats of violence, psychological pressure achieved by traditional rituals and the 
threat of turning the victim over to the police as undocumented migrants are used to achieve 
control over the victims (Mazzitelli 2007:1078-1079).  
 
“By employing modern transport links in present day Nigeria, traffickers are very effective 
because they “combine the best of both modern and older worlds by allying sophisticated 
forms of modern technology to tribal customs”.  
(Shelley 2003:127) 
 
The Nigerian “network” type has been copied and is currently being developed in Ghana, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal. This “network type” is based on a loose and fragmented business-
oriented form, which may be the reason why they are successful in the arena of global modern 
“disorganized” crime (Mazzitelli 2007:1084). More traditional organized criminal models, 
which is connected to the Sicilian mafia, the American Cosa Nostra or the Japanese Yakuza 
do not harmonize with the conditions that are in play in the African context. It is evident that 
project based, business-oriented structures are best fitted to this particular context (Ibidem). 
 
“African criminal networks (ACNs) have certain prime characteristics. 
Typically, such a network: 
 
• is made of small, compartmentalized cells of between two and ten members; 
• consists mostly of kinsmen from the same ethnic group or clan; 
• communicates mostly in the local language; 
• shares some confidence, but with minimal trust among members; 
• makes deals and then disperses, regrouping only at a later date; 
• is highly mobile; 
• adopts false or protected identities for its members, including changing their nationality; 
• adapts readily to any new environment; 
• is ready to bribe and corrupt government officials; 
• refrains from the use of violence in order not to attract the attention of law 
enforcement operators”. 
(Mazzitelli 2007:1084) 
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The distribution of payment among members is broadly based on an egalitarian partnership. 
Scale of payment is then estimated out of how much of a special skill members contribute. 
Interestingly, there is not a high degree of trust at play in these connections, information 
sharing is for example limited only to what each member needs to know to perform his task. 
Further, a member of an “ACN” can be a part of more than one network. Secrecy and 
individuals loyalty is further strengthened by cultural pressure and by the use of religious and 
occult rituals (Mazzitelli 2007:1085). This may be in accordance with similar rituals taking 
place in Japanese, Italian and Mexican criminal groups to strengthen loyalty. 
 
These African Criminal Networks may be considered as project based short-term 
groups/networks, rather than long-term enterprises specialising in particular brands of crime 
(Ibidem). 
 
“…the organizational structure [of criminal groups in West Africa] may be similar to [that] 
employed by legitimate small scale enterprises found [among] ethno-cultural groups 
disproportionately arrested for drug trafficking. First the enterprises usually involve masters 
(entrepreneurs) and apprentices (those training to become traders or suppliers in particular 
goods and services). Second, there is cooperation among the enterprises/entrepreneurs, such 
that if goods are not available in a given shop it is collected and supplied from another 
entrepreneur. Third, many of the entrepreneurs have relations or acquaintances abroad that 
facilitate payment for the imported goods, usually for a commission.” 
(UNODC Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region 2005: 15-16) 
 
One should always consider the implications of this mode of operation. The very ad hoc and 
casual network approach makes detection and investigation extremely difficult, and then we 
have yet to take into account the effects of ethnic rituals to bind the few connections that exist 
in tighter (UNDOC TOCWAR 2005:16). Further it gives an insight into the methodological 
problems involving west-African organized criminal networks. 
 
Howard Abadinsky, a dissident voice in the analysis of Nigerian Organized Crime mode of 
operation, claims to have found evidence of a hierarchical structure where drug barons rule 
vast organizations through top down organization (Allum 2004:143). 
 
 
 64 
4.1.2. Concluding on definition 
 
Taking Abadinsky’s point into consideration, the majority of voices focusing on the very form 
of Nigerian organized crime are in general agreement that the form leans toward a network 
based, project-oriented mode of operation with frequent change of actors. It is however 
interesting to note Mazzitelli’s point on the minimal trust existing between actors in the 
Nigerian networks. If there is a significant lack of trust between actors one should expect a 
higher level of cooperation towards law enforcement in situations where actors become 
arrested. However the minimal information that is on a need-to-know basis only, buffers the 
impact of any cooperation taking place. Further, the ethnic rituals must segment some level of 
trust, or perhaps fear, that discourages cooperation toward law-enforcement. Maybe a better 
way of looking at the level of trust in Nigerian Networks is to point out that its on a minimal 
level, but minimal in the sense that its a level that still gives the networks a level of 
functionality and buffering against law enforcement agencies. Further, its not a formalized 
trust through hierarchal structures from top to bottom, but a loosely based face-value trust that 
fits in with the modes of operation in Nigerian or African criminal networks. 
 
The conclusion on the terminology regarding Nigerian organized criminal networks is 
therefore to define them as Nigerian Criminal networks in a looser non-hierarchical mode of 
operation. Alan Blocks overhanging definition on organized crime, the connection between 
upper word and lower world agents, is still in play, and will be scrutinized more thorough in 
the next chapter that discuss the social network approach in view of Nigerian criminal 
networks together with how these evolved into their particular brand of organized criminal 
networks. 
 
4.2. Social Networks 
 
4.2.1. Introduction 
 
As argued in part 3.2 and 3.3 of the thesis, social networks are the backbone of all attempts at 
organized crime. When at one hand it forms a cornerstone of mankind’s “pack-mentality” or 
“social-animal” way of approaching its surroundings it is on the other hand in direct 
opposition to rational professional bureaucratic oriented forms of organization. That 
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organized crime, which dips into both the formal and informal spheres, is in existence, is an 
indicator that this friction between social networking and formal professionalism is at play. 
Further on, one may suggest that the level of organized crime will therefore tell us something 
about the level of “social-professional” friction is going on in any given region if we are 
supplied with the relevant data. This friction can be viewed as the opposing interest of the 
formal and informal structures. 
 
Nigeria is perhaps one of the worlds regions with the highest level of socio-professional 
friction, stemming from its colonial past, and neo-colonial present.  
 
Mazzitelli’s argument regarding African criminal networks considering its apparent “softer” 
approach when contemplating the inherent level of violence, also raises some fundamental 
questions. It seems that refraining from the use of violence to avoid attracting attention from 
law enforcement is not a dominant trait in other cultural related forms of organized crime. 
Social networking theory, and especially the African high level of informal connections 
permeating the society, may partly explain this particular aspect of African and Nigerian 
organized criminal networks. 
 
4.2.2. Political criminal nexus 
 
”Nigerian Law does not conceptualize crime” 
(Ebbe 1997:1) 
 
Obi N. Ebbe states in his 1999 paper “The Political-Criminal Nexus: The Nigerian Case.” 
That the predatory Nigerian state head of state has much in common with a head of an 
organized crime “family, using criminal individuals and syndicates to exploit his country 
(Ebbe 1999:29). Much like Mahmoud Mamdani argues that most sub-Saharan states only 
gives the impression of democracy, while centralized despotic rule more often then not is the 
basis for government (Mamdani 1996:25), Ebbe argues that the Nigerian states lacks the 
checks and balances found in  a democracy (Ebbe 1999:29). Ebbes insight in the duality of the 
Nigerian state is significant because the problem is then studied by an actor who is born and 
bred under this system. His study spans over a thirty-year period, from January 1966 until 
March 1999. Ebbe has analyzed both personal and telephone interviews and performed 
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content analysis of newspapers and magazines (ibid.). Personal interviews were done with 
former cabinet ministers, senior military bureaucratic personnel, and civil servants among 
others. Ebbe has also interviewed 28 area boys, a Nigerian generic term describing 
unemployed youth1, who according to Ebbe watched the young members of the “419” 
organized crime syndicates (Ebbe 1999:30). 419 refer to a Nigerian penal code that touches 
upon fraud through various means (Ebbe 1997:74, Peel 2006:4-5). Ebbe focuses mainly on 
the symbiosis between the political arena and the criminal. The problematic use of the term 
organized crime has been under controversy for some time. Ebbe also goes through a 
clarification where he tries to define the “right” definitional term for criminal networks or 
organized crime.  
The Nigerian law however has no concept of organized crime, rather a law against conspiracy 
which overreach the subject in a multitude of ways (Ebbe1999:31).  
 
4.2.3. Emerging nexus 
 
Nigeria is a fragmented puzzle of different nations designed by colonial powers to serve its 
own interest. Disregarding former set boundaries between the three major Nigerian ethnic 
groups, the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba, there was no strong regional will to follow the colonials 
projects suit (Ibidem). 
 
Nigerias natural resources are often called the “national cake”. Even in colonial times the 
three ethnic groups strived for control over the resources. The following independence and 
democratic project intensified the struggle. Embezzlement of federal property by regional 
politicians became more and more common. Civil servants followed after with their own 
brand of corruption. Law enforcement was at the same time having their difficulties with their 
own ethnic-divide. Dissatisfaction over this state of affair led up to the military coup of 1966. 
The military regimes however, did not differ in the corruption factor, widespread 
embezzlement was still rampant (Ebbe 1999:31-32).    
 
In the period August 1966 through December 1998, Nigeria went through seven military 
regimes and only one democratically elected civilian regime. Every one of the six military 
                                                 
1
 For a more specific and sociological insight in the area boys phenomenon look up “identity transformation and 
identity politics under structural adjustment in Nigeria” 2000 edit. Jega, Chapter 9 Abubakar Momoh, “Youth 
culture and area boys in Lagos”. 
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regimes functioned like an organized crime family (Ebbe 1999:32-33). They marginalized the 
role of Nigerian Police, ruled by martial law, and effectively destabilized the rule of law. Each 
regime had its own Inspector General of Police whose job unofficially was to turn a blind eye 
to malfeasances and criminal connections in the government (Ebbe 1999:33). 
 
The “national cake” was fair game. Every politician and top civil servant looked upon 
Nigeria’s natural resources as something “up for grabs”. Criminal techniques were developed 
by different ethnic groups to secure their share. The head of the military regime represented 
only his very own interests, and that of his ethnic foundation. The short-lived democracy that 
spanned from 1960 to 1964 may imply a weakening in the political-criminal nexus according 
to Ebbe (Ibidem). 
 
“Every military regime in Nigeria suspended the Constitution and ruled by martial 
law. The first six Nigerian military regimes also suspended the rule of law. In other 
words, martial power was used to overthrow the rule of law. Like an organized 
crime family, each regime ruled by intimidation, threats, and murder. Journalists 
and politicians who criticized the military leaders' policies and flagrant criminal 
activities were either assassinated, detained, imprisoned after trial on trumped-up 
charges, or driven to self-exile.” 
(Ebbe 1999:33) 
 
One may divide Nigeria’s organized criminal networks into 3 main types: The traditional 
criminal syndicates of the 1960s to the present, the “419” syndicates of the 1980s to present, 
and the secret societies of past and present. Each type of organized crime body has its own 
specialty. Unlike, for example the United States, there is no division of territory, nor is there a 
common bond between organized crime syndicate (Ebbe 1999:40). 
 
“In the wake of the oil boom, organized crime activities developed in the context of 
various relationships and enterprises that can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Governor/Minister--Domestic contractors, and organized crime.  
2. Governor/Minister--Foreign contractors, and organized crime.  
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3. Minister--Federal agencies graft gangs. Passport Office, Citizenship Office, Immigrant 
Visa Office,Customs and Excise Office, Nigerian Airways Corporation, Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigerian External Telecommunication, etc. (NET). 
4. Military/Politicians--vice operations. Brothels, Gambling Casinos. 
5. Illegitimate Enterprises:  Child trafficking and slave labor, trading body parts, narcotics 
trafficking, illegal importation of certain goods, counterfeit currency dealing. 
6. Legitimate Enterprises:  Illegal diversion of government property, illegal contracts and 
ghost contractors.” 
(Ebbe 199:35-36) 
 
These links between the informal and formal stem from the inherent effects of widespread 
endemic corruption. However, to see Nigeria and south Sahara as exclusive when it comes to 
corruption is of course a mistake. One can find corruption in developed countries like United 
States, Britain, France, Greece, Japan and Italy. Types of corruption differ, and we have to use 
some typologies to expand upon the subject. One possibility is to span corruption from the 
petty type onward to a more serious political corruption. Political corruption is a very 
dangerous type as it transforms the drive to achieve power not as means to govern for the 
common good, but as a means to achieve personal riches, and spread the benefits of 
corruption onward to supporters. Nigeria may even be said to have a vast system of 
institutionalized political corruption sometimes stemming from the very top and pervading all 
governmental institutions with broad links to the rest of society (Agbu 2003:3-4). 
 
4.2.4. Sociocultural factors 
 
Ebbe brings forward three factrors that are important in connection to the political-criminal 
nexus. First of all: the interethnic scramble to secure the bigger slice of Nigeria’s (National 
Cake). Second, the concept of extended families, of being a brother’s keeper and the 
dependent connections this makes, and finally a culture that honor conspicuous consumption 
(Ebbe 1999:42). 
 
The expectations of the extended family system and sons cultural requirement to take care of 
aged parents create a high level of pressure. As public opinion tend to think “what belongs to 
the government also belongs to everybody”, stealing from the government is a minor fault at 
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best. A son with a government position that do not embezzle and exploit his position is 
actually frowned upon as weak and ill-willed. “Clean” government officials are viewed as 
worthless. They may be called “Holy Nweje”, a “slang”-type word that means a false holy 
person in the eyes of God. Similar views and expectations can be found in all ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, and in all African societies south of the Sahara (Ebbe 1999:43). 
 
The strive to achieve economical success can even lead people to join secret societies that 
may or may not involve occult rituals to cement trust and bonds. These societies fall into a 
whole new category that takes their places in the political criminal nexus. These cults are well 
documented in African law and literature about Nigerian customs (Ebbe 1999:43-44). 
 
4.2.5. 419 political connection 
 
Through his interviews with “area boys” Ebbe also establishes a clear 419-syndicate 
connection to participants in Nigeria’s political system (Ebbe 1999:46). 
 
This connection involves defrauding national and foreign governments, banks and businesses, 
money laundering and running illegal businesses such as brothels and casinos for the 
politicians. The 419 groups on one hand establishes hotels and other businesses under 
fictitious names for the politicians and the they on the other hand provide immunity from 
police harassment and prosecution by law enforcement (Ibidem). 
 
Even providing personal security for politicians are an franchise for some 419-groups. 
In all cases, a mutual bond of respect coupled with financial and nonfinancial favors are 
exchanged. An example may be the case of a body-parts business run by a Mr. Otokoto that 
never went to trial because it was alleged that a top Nigerian politician was involved in the 
franchise (Ibidem). 
 
The case is luckily not entirely one sided. Some custom officials and police officers arrest 
smugglers and other criminals whenever they can catch them. Soldiers that are not involved in 
criminal franchise have become whistle blowers and testified against their superiors. 
International organizations such as the Commonwealth of Nations, OPEC, and foreign 
organizations exert pressure on the wholesale political corruption. World opinion that frowns 
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upon corruption is another factor that hinders a rampant open state of the political criminal 
nexus. Lastly the possibility of political reshuffle after electoral periods is also a threat for the 
criminal connection. All these factors perform at least some dampening effect on the scale of 
the problem (Ebbe 1999:46) 
 
“The validity of the data on the political-criminal nexus in Nigeria presented here 
is supported by the fact that in 1996, the present Head of state of Nigeria, General 
Abacha, gave back to the Nigerian people and government all money and properties 
he acquired illegally and ordered all members of his cabinet, other politicians, and 
directors of statutory corporations to do the same. Also in 1996, General Abacha's 
government mounted a thorough investigation into the operations of "419" organized 
crime syndicates and the activities of senior bank officials while he was a 
participant in "419" enterprises. The result was the arrest of over 2,000 bank managers 
and bank accountants on charges of fraud, embezzlement, and illegal financial manipulation.” 
(Ebbe 1999:49) 
 
4.2.6. Concluding on social networks 
 
Starting our social networks comparative analysis of Nigerian and organized criminal 
networks globally we can draw some immediate assumptions connected to similarities. 
Gambetta’s point when reflecting upon the system of Habsburg-Spain to divide Italy in two 
antagonistic areas that where put against each other, strikes a certain chord when looking 
upon Ekeh’s argument of colonial socio-constructive projects. It also resonates with 
Mahmood Mamdani’s views on colonial power; loosely affiliated autonomous social domains 
suddenly found themselves bound together toward a nexus of native power, where none 
before had existed (Mamdani 1996:110). These different native nexuses that today may be 
claimed to form the “new” ethnic geographical areas, where used as pieces on a board, putting 
one against another in instances where it met the colonial powers interest, strengthening some 
weak pieces by putting them on top of each other, and thereby creating new native nexuses. 
Here is probably a significant factor in the divide between state and public, the same divide or 
“hole” that gives the possibility to form networks of organized crime. It is also a factor in the 
level of socio-professional friction that exists between the bureaucratic sphere and the 
informal. 
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The basis of divide and distrust between the public and state is present, but why in such a high 
degree in Nigeria in contrast to all other global organized crime ventures? How can a 
political-criminal nexus form, where the difference between criminal and politician starts to 
blur? 
 
Looking on Mazzitelli’s particulars of African criminal networks two factors stands out: 
 
1. African criminal networks are loosely based and undergoing a large degree of 
interchange of manpower in a continual process. There is no clear hierarchical 
structure. No African “Toto Riina, capo dei capi” that clearly symbolise some form of 
centralized power. Is highly mobile and shows an uncanny ability to adjust to new 
forms of environment. 
 
2. Refrains from violence in order to avoid attention from law-enforcement. 
 
The last of these factors are perhaps the most striking. It is not often that organized crime is 
connected to non-violence. However we must assume that some level of violent posture must 
be at play to strengthen opportunities of sanction. Africa’s affinity toward occult rituals is also 
a factor here that acts as a partial substitute for violence. Still, we have not yet uncovered the 
whole picture. There must be more factors at play, some which we, of course, will not 
discover in the near future. 
 
Looking at China we may also see some level of loose networking. However the emphasis 
should here be on network rather than loose network, which may be better for the African 
concept. Seeing that Chinese organized criminal networks appear to be the closest in social 
network perspective to Nigerian criminal networks makes us possible to connect some 
cultural concepts;  
 
That Guanxi networks use much of the same social mechanics as the African economy of 
affection. 
 
As both of these cultural processes are related to kin or family we can without severe 
contradictions allow for a basic similarity. Both concepts exists on a informal plane outside 
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the formal-bureaucratic sphere, and both concepts branches out overseas to diasporas that are 
connected perhaps in a weak degree when it comes to the Chinese, and more strongly in the 
Nigerian sense. Diaspora’s are a concept related to a migrated segment of population from a 
specific country1. Examples are the Irish and Italian diasporas in the USA and the Turkish 
diaspora in Germany. 
 
This is however not enough to explain all the characteristics of African or Nigerian criminal 
networks. Contrary to the Chinese that involve a much higher degree of organizational level, 
Nigerian networks are more loosely based, is made of small compartmentalized cells of 
between two and ten members, shares some confidence, but with minimal trust among 
members and makes deals and then disperses, regrouping only at a later date. Hyden describes 
the economy of affection in a striking similar way: 
 
“Sought-after goods – whether material or symbolic such as prestige and status – have a 
scarcity value, that is, they may be physically available, but not accessible to all, so people 
invest in relations with others to obtain them.” 
(Hyden 2006:76) 
 
Comparing it with Aning’s more specific definition on African criminal networks we see clear 
similarities: 
 
“West Africans, . . ., have become significant players in the international trade in illicit drugs. 
Yet it is hardly possible to identify structured, hierarchical groups staffed by West Africans in 
this particular field of activity. Successful West African drug trade[rs] appear to be 
overwhelmingly individuals who recruit associates only where necessary and generally on an 
ad hoc basis. They may also be active in other fields of criminal activity, as well as in 
legitimate business. These characteristics, which are to some extent traditional among West 
African traders, can be turned to great advantage in modern, globalized markets, including 
illegal ones.” (Aning 2007:195) 
 
 Looking upon these factors together with Mazzitelli’s description of African criminal 
networks a question has to be asked: 
                                                 
1
 Cambridge advanced learner’s dictionary. 
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Is the Nigerian criminal networks integrated into Nigerian society in the same degree as 
Hydens economy of affection. Or to put it more bluntly; is Nigerian criminal networks the 
very same conceptual socio-mechanism as the economy of affection? 
 
The implications of this question are striking; How else can we reasonably explain Ebbe’s 
nexus of politics and crime? The very factors that comes into the equation, the loose 
interchangeable networking, strikes a much similar chord to the way the economy of affection 
works. Why, for example, is it so hard to conceptualize Nigerian Criminal Networks as an 
entity or sphere in a Nigerian context, when the same Criminal Networks stands clearly out in 
a overseas western context? As Ekeh pointed out; getting resource and advantage from the 
state, or the mother country in the former colonial context, is perfectly plausible, even a 
demand that is inherent in society.  
 
“It is worth noting in the context of this discussion that many Nigerians hold the West 
responsible for the country’s decline. For many this has provided justification for their 
involvement in criminal activities. Engagement in crime is considered justifiable in order to 
redistribute wealth back from those who have ‘stolen’ it.” 
(Shaw 2002:295) 
 
The same arguments are used in connection to defend the actions of participants in Nigerian 
criminal networks. And why even defend the actions, if the actions themselves where not 
viewed as crime by the actors themselves? 
 
Another important question that arises is Ebbe’s seemingly contrary statement that Nigerian 
organized crime is a hierarchical nexus with a family head. Here we have to look closer on 
Ebbe’s political-criminal relationship; there is in Ebbe’s article a clear distinction between the 
upper-level political structure, that at some level needs to be in a formal hierarchy, and the 
lower level crime groups that is not specifically structurally described. It remind us of the 
general definition that Block uses on organized crime, with a connection between upper and 
lower class society. Ebbe’s nexus rather describe the connection between a hierarchical 
political sphere and a criminal one, rather than explaining Nigerian OCN as hierarchical 
themselves.   
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The friction between social-networks and the ideal of professional bureaucracy in Italy, 
China, Japan and Russia leads to the living-space that has to be present for organized criminal 
networks to exist. It is however probable that the very social networking dynamics that stems 
from man being a social-animal and not a solitary one, is the same dynamics that motor 
organized criminal networks to some degree. This is especially clear looking at the way 
Nigerian crime stands out in a “western” context, but seems to dissolve into society and the 
economy of affection in the Nigerian context. According to Ebbe, it is difficult to see where 
the crime starts and where the politics end and visa versa.  In part 4.4 “Diaspora” and part 4.5 
“The technology factor” we will attempt to look even closer upon the implications of Nigerian 
criminal networks in an overseas context. 
 
4.3. Economic collapse 
 
Harsh periods of military dictatorships, a failed structural adjustment programme, economic 
mismanagement and continuous political conflict are factors that lead up to the decline and 
economic crisis of the Nigerian state in the 1980s (Shaw 2002: 294). Perhaps the most 
important factor however was the collapse of the Oil Boom in the same period (Wannenburg 
2002:6). 
 
In the early 1970s discovery of oil had brought great affluence in Nigeria, and its importance 
made the oil prices up’s and down’s proportional to Nigeria’s economic health (Shaw 
2002:295). Patronage and alliances with multinational corporations developed as a strategy of 
economic and political security. By co-opting and emasculate dissenters, patronage was 
achieved by getting control over natural resources or the agricultural sector. By giving the 
corporations political protection, enormous profits were generated and enriched a small 
indigenous elite (Wannenburg 2002:7). 
 
The economic collapse led to processes of criminalization, for example the consumer goods 
market; Price controls on agricultural products where enforced to stem political unrest in the 
urban areas. Rural producers who experienced a very low price on their products either cut 
their output or smuggled their goods to more attractive markets. Even though governments 
tried hard to control markets, informal black markets appeared (Ibidem). 
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The informal sector and the economy of affection got more and more important in the face of 
collapse: 
 
“Small and medium businesses and traders found it difficult to compete in an environment 
where inflation was high and their prices were undercut by competitors from the 
informal sector. Most informal traders, on the other hand, eked out a subsistence livelihood. 
To give an indication of this trend, the informal economy currently employs 65 per cent 
of the population and contributes 60 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries. It makes up 50 per cent 
of all intra-regional trade.” 
(Ibidem). 
 
4.3.1. Reflecting on collapse. 
 
It is important to underline that the collapse and change in the Nigerian context was a purely 
economical one. Japan and Italy both had reforms changing the socio-economic order in a 
political context. The cultural revolution in China was one of the more important factors for 
its Diaspora and Russia, though directly an economical change, it was first and foremost a 
political-economical change from the far left to the mainstay right. This raises the question 
why an economic collapse alone strengthens the informal and thereby the economy of 
affection. Perhaps we need to view the collapse as the spark that lights the powder-keg? 
Maybe this potential for a fast regress toward the informal in view of any crisis, stems from 
the extraordinary historical context southern-Sahara experienced in the last approx. 100 years 
as we discussed in part 2.5.5? 
 
In a period close to a century, the continent goes from a largely primordial society, to 
colonial, and lastly to a “democratic free state” period. The socio-economic implications of 
fundamental changes in every level of a society’s institutions, over such a short period of 
time, seems to be unprecedented in modern history. This is probably one major factor why the 
informal sector and the economy of affection are predominant, and why an economic collapse 
throws a country even deeper into the informal direction. 
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4.4. Diaspora or globalization?  
 
Diaspora: noun 
“the spreading of people from one original country to other countries1.” 
 
As the Chinese diaspora was connected to the cultural revolutions marginalization of certain 
ethnic groups, the economic collapse in Nigeria also prompted a migration of Nigerian 
nationals. The problem of “brain-drain” in the African context has always been a valid and 
apparent issue. It is however unlikely to find a connection between high-education and crime 
in a general sense.  
 
Some level of monetary funds has to be available to reach the “western” sphere of the world. 
Is it therefore possible that the Nigerian diaspora is divided into two main categories of 
migrants? Firstly, Nigerians with a higher level of education seeking job opportunities in 
other countries that are otherwise lacking at home. Secondly, crime financed travel connected 
to the criminal franchises of the Nigerian criminal networks? 
 
Ethnic fragmented diaspora. 
 
“The chronicles of diasporas—those of the black Atlantic, of metropolitan Jewry, of mass 
rural displacement—constitute the ground swell of modernity.” 
(Chambers 1994:16) 
 
When discussing an ethnically diverse federation like Nigeria its important to further discuss 
the inherent problems this raises. As opposed to Chinese migration toward the US, Nigerian 
migration is both diverse and multi-cultural.  
 
In her article; West Africa Review (1999), Nationalism in a Virtual Space: Immigrant 
Nigerians on the Internet, Misty L. Bastian discussed the implications of Nigerian diaspora 
Internet communities. She claims to find evidence that different ethnic groups like Obi and 
Yoruba, come together in mutual discussion both also form their own ethnic forums with 
mutual accusation of Tribalism on the internet. 
 
                                                 
1
 Cambridge advanced learner’s dictionary. 
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This form of “Tribalism” or perhaps ethnic specialization is important when discussing the 
Nigerian criminal networks impact on “western” society because in many instances it is 
ethnically specialized. In South Africa the Ibo group seems to have taken the lead with the 
Biafran war and the oil boom-crisis as the major factors for their migration (Legget 2001: 40, 
Shaw 2002:295-296).  
 
In Britain and specific London the Yoruba group is dominant. For example in a survey of 
schoolchildren in London approx. 10 000 spoke Yoruba while only 2000 spoke Ibo. The 
Yoruba group in Nigeria is connected to accounting, banking and legal scams, further 
implying an ethnic specific crime diversification (Peel 2006:22). However, it is important to 
underline that the Yoruba group in Britain is both economically successful and has maintained 
a low criminal profile (Klein 2009:391) 
 
The Nigerian trafficking and sex-Industry is connected to an even smaller geographically and 
demographic ethnic group, the Edo.  In the “journal of culture and African women studies”, 
Oluwakemi A. Adesina sheds some light on the connection between Edo state and Nigerian 
trafficking. In the light of the economical crisis of the 1980s, the sex industry became the only 
economical solution for many Edo women both in Nigeria and abroad. 
 
4.4.1. Concluding on the ethnic connections 
 
There is the inherent problem of generalizing people out of their ethnic context to this chain 
of discussion. On the one hand one has to take account of some level of discrepancy, as it is 
easy to link one group to one set of crime. It is a well-established human condition to 
compartmentalize and categorize to make understanding easier on the whole. On the other 
hand, if we went in the direction to disregard the ethnic dimension, and label all forms of 
Nigerian related crime as exactly “Nigerian” wouldn’t we loose a important factor to explain 
the specific brand of criminal networking? We have to take into account some level of 
generalization while we at the same time see a cultural connection to specific types of 
Nigerian criminal networks. 
 
It is however apparent that the Ibo connection of South Africa is empirically much weaker 
than the Edo connection to trafficking. The social and cultural background for Edo 
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predominance in the Nigerian sex industry seems to firstly stem from a diaspora that was 
displaced from more mundane work like farming in Italy to the sex industry. Later the sex-
industry in Edo state has been largely accepted as “normal” work where a bill that tried to 
criminalize sex-traffickers where actually met with public outcry (Adesina, 2006).  
 
The Ibo connection is on the other hand is much weaker. We can see some plausible causality 
in the Biafran war and the economic crisis as Shaw and Legget underlines, but the empirical 
data or the effect is spurious at best.  
 
All three ethnic connections need more qualitative and quantitative research before we can 
reach any significant ethnic network-criminal conclusions, and the object of study is better 
described as Nigerian criminal networks, for now. 
 
4.5. The technology factor 
 
4.5.1. Introduction 
 
“The infamous ‘419’ advance fee fraud scam is a major source of spam which takes its 
victims for hundreds of millions of dollars yearly. Email headers confirm that much of this 
traffic currently comes out of Lagos and Amsterdam.”  
(Edelson 2003:392) 
 
Firstly we will look upon the direct consequences of the 419 industry, its impact both locally 
and international, and lastly, upon the technological factor. 
 
4.5.2. Code: 419 
 
The code “419” has perhaps today progressed into the most well-known phrase connected to 
Nigerian criminal networks. It has taken its name from a statute in the Nigerian criminal code. 
The scam itself always use dynamics where the recipient end has to take the fraudulent offer 
on a face value, however, the end-benefits drawn up by the “yahoozie” or fraudster, are 
always at such a scale that some disregard the apparent lacking in security, and forward a set 
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amount of money which will “set free” the much larger amount. The end-benefit monetary 
goal is usually between 35 and 75 million American dollars (Buchanan 2001 39-40). 
 
Why then, does these propositions that appears as somewhat comic additions to your mail-
inbox, net in hundred of millions of dollars1 in some estimates? Most of these mails are 
promptly discarded or already caught in some spam-filters net. However, just a tiny nibble on 
the bait sets in motion a well oiled machine that seems to master the art of social discourse 
and persuasion. Great lengths of convincing and deliberation take place. Disinterested parties 
from an European country is suddenly introduced, to make the suggestion more sound. An 
important sounding institution2 appears to lend its weight to the proposal. The number of 
persuasion techniques is many and resourceful. The end scenario too often involves the 
coercion and defrauding of the recipient victim. When the first payment has arrived, 
roadblocks suddenly occur; the proposition has been discovered and bribe money is needed, 
shipping fees or insurance are needed etc. The victim continues paying until he realizes the 
fraud or he is out of monetary funds (Buchanan 2001:40, Smith 1999: 3-4). 
 
4.5.3. The people behind 419 
 
 
“The Kakadu group; 
 
A Nigerian, Raphael Ajukwara, alias James Kakudu, lived in Sierra Leone and worked as a 
dealer in car spares. He owned a personal computer and had a good knowledge of information 
technology having completed at least one college course in computer studies. 
Ajukwara/Kakudu was also a business associate of three other Nigerians, Uche Okafor, 
Richard Ekechukwu, and another known only as Alex, plus a Ghanaian, Charles Doe. Also 
connected with the gang was Ajukwara’s Sierra Leonean girlfriend, Isatu Bah. All of the 
group were well educated, enabling them to operate a series of typical “419” frauds—
although Isatu Bah was only a schoolgirl at the time of her arrest. In a number of cases they 
successfully defrauded substantial sums of money from their victims. With the profits they 
were able to invest in legitimate merchandise imported from Nigeria, which they sold in 
Freetown.” (ODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region, 2005:14). 
                                                 
1
 Edelson,  2003:392 
2
 Institutions that in most cases never existed, but have similar name-sakes that seems familiar for the recipient.  
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As our example sketches, most of the fraudsters seem to be Nigerians abroad and at home. 
The groups or networks, as in accordance to Mazzitelli’s view on African criminal networks, 
are ad hoc, run along ethnic lines in some degree and in some instances involves family ties. 
The members of 419 groups do not seem to try to keep themselves out of public view. In 
Amsterdam for example, the fraudsters are so well known that policemen amuse themselves 
with SMS telling them that they “know what they are up to”. The 419 industry are neither 
compartmentalized against other forms of crime. Nigerian drug dealers have been known to 
shift their field of interest onward to 419 scams as this is looked upon as cheaper and safer, 
and 419ers are said to invest their earnings into importing drugs among other things (Edelson 
2003:394-395). 
 
As we have discussed before, when provoked or tempted into explaining their motivations, 
arguments around payback for colonialism are forwarded, or resentment of official corruption 
(Ibidem). 
 
 The geographical spread of origin when it comes to 419 scams seems to have the following 
pattern: 
“ 
(37%) Specific Nigerian ISPs 
(30%) Satellite providers to Nigerian ISPs 
(9%) Cote d'Ivoire and other West African countries 
(3%) South Africa 
(15%) Netherlands 
(3%) Elsewhere in Europe (mostly UK and France) 
(4%) USA” 
(Edelson 2003:396)     
 
Edelson used relationship mapping, a technique used to map the strengths and relationships 
between the terrorists involved in the World Trade Centre attack. It looks upon shared 
addresses and travel patterns in order to view nodes of influence. Internet Service Providers 
and e-mail headers where used in the collection of data (Edelson 2003:395). 
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Approximately 70% percent of the traceable traffic seems to originate from west Africa, 
mainly Nigeria (Edelson 2003:396). The scammers also construct online web sites that mimic 
“financial management” firms, official lotto schemes or real Banks. At first, shoddily and 
amateurishly made, later attempts at web design have been more advanced even with PHP 
scripts checking for “mock” authorization. In 2002, a group of Nigerians in Johannesburg 
were arrested for making a website that had stolen content from legitimate banks (Ibidem). In 
the aftermath of the Tahiti earthquake scam mails with genuine Red Cross or Unicef logos 
appeared1. Atleast one of these were traced to a computer in Nigeria. 
 
Popular-culture even uses 419 scam as a source of entertainment. Cruder ideas can involve 
something as simple as providing the scammer with the phone number of the local police 
department and the suggestion that the scammer call as soon as possible. Elaborate Web-
pages exists that celebrate the 419 mails hilarity and sometimes hidden pop culture 
references2 
 
Some analysts trace the origins of the 419 scam back to the 1970s and 1980s in Nigeria. This 
was the period of the oil boom that created opportunities for Nigerians with access to 
government contacts and foreign actors with the ability to provide goods and services. The 
imported goods where then over-invoiced, resulting in a huge imbalance in the funds made 
available in contrast to the goods actually delivered. Today, the connection to government 
officials are not needed, and actually very little funds are required to set up and carry out the 
419 scams  (ODC, TOCWAR, 2005:24) 
 
4.5.4. Internet access 
 
“The more one learns about Internet access in West Africa, the more impressive the level of 
activity seems. Nigeria, with the continent’s largest population (over 120 million3 — half 
under the age of 18), has the fewest Internet connections. Africa as a whole has the world’s 
lowest fiber optic coverage — almost all international bandwidth is provided by satellite - 
and the lowest telephone (and by extension) internet density, something under 1%.” 
(Edelson 2003:397). 
                                                 
1
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8517243.stm 
2
 www.scamorama.com , “Presents: The lads from Lagos.” 
3
 In 2010 the estimate lies around 150 million. 
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Cybercafes, an important institution connected to 419, use satellite services rather than dial 
up, as the latter is more expensive relative to income than anywhere else in the world. This is 
not because of the Nigerian government; they have actually worked toward expanding land 
lines, satellite communication and cellular telephony. Mobile phones have for example 
become more dominant than main telephone lines (Ibidem). 
 
One could argue that 419 spam is helping this development onward. But on the other hand 
cybercafés are in risk of disconnect from the ISP (Internet Service Provider) if the spam 
emanating from one café is too flagrant. Internet access through mobile phones is appearing 
as alternatives to cybercafés (Ibidem). In fact cybercafés are known to post notes on the walls 
warning of possible arrests for people partaking in 419 scams (Longe 2008:135). 
 
Especially today with the current development in cellular Internet access, it is likely that this 
sphere will be more dominant in the 419 industry in the future. Mobility and the problem of 
easily pinpoint the origin of spam-mails will make the situation even more chaotic for law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
4.5.5. Internet infrastructure in Africa 
 
Development of Internet infrastructure differs in each country because of the States current 
policy on e-infrastructure. Regulatory frameworks and competition between Internet Service 
Providers all play in into the final equation that lays the foundation for Internet infrastructure 
(Mutula 2003:489). 
 
In Chinn and Fairlie’s article from 2006 they analyze the “digital divide” between 
industrialised and under developed countries (Chinn 2006:17-18). They used a data set from 
the International Telecommunication’s Union (World Telecommunication Indicators 
Database), which is collected through annual questionnaires by the ITU. The rates indication 
computer and Internet penetration are connected to number of personal computers and 
internet users per 100 people. The dataset have some inherent weaknesses. Firstly, the number 
of computers may understate the total use of computers in countries where mainframe 
computers or Internet nexuses are prevalent. Second, the data gives us no indication upon 
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which level of quality the computers in use actually have. The quality of an areas computer 
park will have some implications that are not shown in the direct counting of computers. 
Finally the number of internet users are based on estimates from ISP subscribers, thus internet 
use may be understated, especially in development countries where internet access is 
connected to rent-for period schemes instead of monthly home-computer internet access 
subscription to a particular ISP (Chinn 2006:21). In sub-Sahara, where cybercafés are an 
important institution when it comes to Internet access, an understatement of numbers will take 
place in a higher degree. 
 
 
 
 
“Figure 4.5.5 Computer and Internet penetration rates for highest, lowest and largest 
countries international telecommunications union (2001) 
 
(Chinn 2006:24)” 
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If we look comparatively on the Sub-Saharan region, Nigeria has a larger value than 
corresponding countries in the selection, for example Benin with only 0.17 computers per 100 
person and Niger in the bottom with only 0,05. Nigeria tops out in the region with 0.68, but 
there is a vast gap to the developed countries values. Interestingly enough, Russia comes out 
with a relatively low value of 4.97 and 2.93 when it comes to Internet users per 100. Russia is 
often connected to cyber-criminality and hacking, so their level of internet access can not 
really be a significant factor looking upon that implication, other factors has to be more 
dominant. Further, Nigeria seems to have a slightly higher level of home computers in view of 
Internet users per 100 person, which is only a value of 0.10. Here we have to take into account 
the significance of cybercafés and the renting of Internet access as a factor that draws the 
value somewhat down.  
 
Still an important question rises looking upon the statistical data on Nigerian Internet access: 
Why is Nigeria so dominant in the 419 industry, as Edelson stated, when their level of internet 
access is so apparently low? 
 
4.5.6. Concluding on the Technology Factor. 
 
In the 419 industry Nigeria stands out as a shining beacon in comparison to other west 
African countries involved in the franchise. Further, it seems that only west-African diaspora 
is involved overseas, and apparently no other cultures can be said to have any particular or 
significant involvement. That Nigeria is dominant can partly be explained by its population 
factor, but can the fact that the overinvoicing of the oil-boom era in Nigeria be a significant 
factor, as mentioned in the report from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime? It is 
plausible, oil economy based underdeveloped countries has always been connected to a 
particular high degree of corruption, for example RA Joseph’s article of 1978 in the journal of 
modern African studies uses Nigeria as case; “Affluence and underdevelopment: the Nigerian 
experience”. 
 
We may have given some indicators on why the 419 industry is dominated by Nigeria, but we 
have not given any clues to why west-Africa as region is the breeding ground for this 
particular brand of criminal networks. In light of the apparently low level of Internet 
infrastructure and Internet access, this shines out as a particular question that we in some way 
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need to answer. That cybercafés are as important as home computers in this instance, gives us 
some indicator that the statistical values needs to be taken with a grain of salt, however this 
cannot be a significant factor in itself. 
 
Buchanan describes the 419 scam as an attempt to achieve some level of face value trust. We 
have to remember that face value trust or; “personal investments in reciprocal relations with 
other individuals as a means of achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to 
attain” as Hyden describes the economy of affection. Hyden’s statement involuntarily strike a 
comical chord as the bait in the 419 scams, often suggested in the tens of millions of dollars, 
can hardly be any more impossible to attain. But joke aside, can we also here connect the 
foundations of the 419 industry to the economy of affection? It certainly stands out as a 
possible solution why Nigeria firstly and West Africa secondly has close to a monopoly when 
it comes to the 419 industry. What better qualifications is there for a scam artist, than growing 
up in an economy of affection where the social skills are the most important for security, as 
the states failure to provide it forces people to form networks of exactly face value trust 
relations? It is likely then, that the same skills that has been constantly honed in a Nigerian or 
west-African upbringing, is the same that gives them their particular edge in electronic-social 
419 scams. Further, as it is connected to the value that gives individuals their unofficial social 
“security-net”, it is also more likely that only this particular group should be involved. On the 
one side one has the “casus belli” payback for colonization or other reasons, on the other the 
means; the very social mechanic that has driven their society from upbringing: Internet 
Economy of Affection. 
 
4.6. Population Factor 
 
Nigeria’s relative high population toward other countries within the southern –Saharan sphere 
may give us some causal explanation to why exactly Nigeria stands out among these states, 
when it comes to Criminal Networks and internet fraud. In Bloom’s analysis of population 
connected to economic development he found the following demographics data for the area. 
The data stems from 2001. 
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Figure 4.6 African Demographics 2001 
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As the data stems from 2001 we may expect a significant rise of Nigeria approx. 120 million 
inhabitants. Some sources that try to take into account estimates of non-registered citizens 
even use numbers as high as 160 million. We therefore have to accept that any number used 
to describe Nigeria’s current population will always be speculative at best. However, there is 
a clear gap between Nigeria and the next country on the list that is hard to overlook. Congo 
only boasts a population of approx. 60 million, half the population of Nigeria. Northern Africa 
falls outside the southern-Saharan economic and cultural region and is not counted. 
 
We may therefore conclude that Nigeria’s population factor has some causal effect on why it 
dominates African criminal networks. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
 
We have through method of difference tried to establish connections between the main factors 
driving other forms of organized crime described in this thesis against the type of Nigerian 
Criminal Networks. Two of the three established main factors do not show any clear signs of 
difference and must therefore be deemed insignificant when it comes to explaining Nigerian 
Criminal Networks: 
 
1. Economic collapse 
Stands out as perhaps the weakest link when attempting to find a difference. Appears to 
support the Economy of Affection link by showing how fragile the Nigerian state appears 
in face of a purely economic crisis and the following emphasis on informal structures after 
the collapse. 
 
2. Diaspora / Migration 
This part of the discussion is a potential difference, but with the level of empirical data in 
place at the time, drawing any significant conclusions is speculative at best. However, 
especially the Edo-ethnic connection seems to be a particular fruitful venue for further 
study. The Edo-Nigerian state is a small geographic area, and the Edo-ethnic group is not 
part of the three major groups (Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani), why such a high level of 
involvement in trafficking? 
 
We now have to underline the significance of the social network factor. At one hand we can 
disregard it as being similar to for example the Guanxi-networks in China and southern Italy’s 
institutionalized corruption. This is a far too general a conclusion to draw; Ebbe’s political 
criminal nexus shows us a degree of both upper and lower level society integration that 
surpasses any State-Organized Crime connection both in China and southern Italy. That it is 
difficult in itself to draw a clear line between Criminal Networks and society in itself, shows a 
difference between the Nigerian against the Chinese and southern Italian type. 
 
Nigeria’s population may have some causality in why Nigeria dominates the African and 
particular west African criminal network sphere. It is a general and logical factor, which may 
give us a pointer to why Nigeria particularly stands out globally when it comes to African 
Criminal Networks. 
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Lastly, we have to mention the wildcard, that metaphorically speaking, comes in from the 
outside. The 419-connection is perhaps the best described element of mainly Nigerian 
Criminal Networks in contemporary literature. At the same time a similar relevant case in 
Italian, Russian, Chinese and Japanese forms of organized crime is not described in a 
comprehensive way. There are no particular connections of E-mail fraud drawn to other forms 
of Organized Criminal Networks than the West African in general and Nigerian in particular. 
Using the method of difference, this has to have some significance for Nigerian Criminal 
Networks. A possible causal explanation will be expressed in the next conclusive and final 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
We will in this chapter first draw up a broad sketch of the steps taken to reach this point in the 
thesis before we start a discussion around some of the findings. The discussion will be divided 
chronologically into firstly a more general discussion around the type of Nigerian Criminal 
networks. Afterwards we will perform a more comprehensive walkthrough of the particulars 
of Nigerian Criminal Networks through: Social network theory and the 419-industry. Lastly in 
the discussion we will attempt to use the Economy of Affection to explain the indicated 
particulars. We will in the end try to summarize some main conclusions. 
 
5.2. Preliminary summary 
 
In chapter two we established basic links of support leading up to the Economy of affection as 
analytic tool to perhaps describe some causal explanations regarding Nigerian Criminal 
Networks. By first using Nettl as a critique around the concept and understanding of the State, 
and the especially problematic shape this concept takes in third world countries. The very 
shape this fragmentation appears in, can be found in Putnam’s text regarding Italy’s divided 
north and south. Here he shows us a possible comparative case of fragmented state to use 
against the Nigerian. Both of these authors cement Ekeh’s basic point of the two publics in 
Africa further. When put together we have a good foundation to base Hyden’s Economy of 
upon as a possible framework for causal factors connected to Nigerian Criminal Networks. It 
is perhaps important to note that at this stage in the thesis we where somewhat unsure if any 
difference between Nigerian and Other forms of Organized Criminal Networks where to be 
found. We may use the analogy that we had the toolbox ready, but were not entirely sure 
which way we had to use it, but knew it was relevant and was to be used in some way. 
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In chapter three we first of all put down a definition on Organized Crime from Alan Block’s 
theory. This definition was found to be both comprehensive and specific to the problem of the 
thesis. Further, we drew together 3 factors that seemed to span all described forms of 
organized crime through method of agreement. The nation specific cases of Organized Crime 
in use were Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese. The Italian type was the best described. 
The following comparative factors that were used were social networks, economic 
collapse/economic change and diaspora/migration. 
 
In chapter four we used the factors found in chapter three, through method of agreement, in a 
comparative analysis against the current literature on Nigerian Criminal Networks, through 
method of difference. Two of the factors seemed to be similar in a broad sense, though not of 
course without some minor discrepancies. The economic collapse factor stands slightly out in 
regards to being a purely economical crisis instead of a fundamental political change like the 
land reforms of Italy and Japan, or fundamental political economic change in Russia and 
China. The diaspora/migration factor stands slightly more out by implying some level of 
ethnic based relationship to particular spheres of Nigerian Criminal Networks. However, this 
discrepancy can also be explained by the fragmented ethnic Nigerian federation and its 
inherent local differences as sketched in both Nettl and Putnam’s theory. We therefore 
disregarded these factors as significant to find any particularisms through method of 
difference. Social Network theory however stands more clearly out than the other two 
mentioned. Not that it is isolated solely to the sphere of Nigerian Criminal Networks 
Franchise, but rather in the level and importance it plays in Nigerian society. Finally the 419-
industry and its particular connection to Nigeria comes into the equation as somewhat of a 
wildcard. Firstly, because it is not described as significant for any other form of Organized 
Criminal Networks, secondly because it is the empirically best described part of the Nigerian 
Criminal Networks. The work through the former chapters will form the basis for our further 
discussion in this chapter. 
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5.3. Discussion 
 
5.3.1. The general brand of Nigerian Criminal Networks 
 
Antonio Mazzitelli1 together with Obi N. Ebbe gives us the most important insights in the 
fundamental logic and dynamics regarding Nigerian Networks. Mazzitelli in a broader sense, 
since he is describing West African Criminal Networks where Nigeria is an important part. 
Ebbe in a more direct sense since his political-criminal nexus gives us an insight in the 
apparent integration between upper level and lower level of society, or more specific; an 
integration between Criminal Networks and the Nigerian sphere of Politics. 
 
If we look upon Mazzitelli’s sketch upon African Criminal Networks indicators we get the 
following factors; 
 
“African criminal networks (ACNs) have certain prime characteristics. 
Typically, such a network: 
 
• is made of small, compartmentalized cells of between two and ten members; 
• consists mostly of kinsmen from the same ethnic group or clan; 
• communicates mostly in the local language; 
• shares some confidence, but with minimal trust among members; 
• makes deals and then disperses, regrouping only at a later date; 
• is highly mobile; 
• adopts false or protected identities for its members, including changing their nationality; 
• adapts readily to any new environment; 
• is ready to bribe and corrupt government officials; 
• refrains from the use of violence in order not to attract the attention of law 
enforcement operators”. 
(Mazzitelli 2007:1084) 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Head of the Regional Office for Central and West Africa of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), Dakar, Senegal. 
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Looking upon these indicators of African Criminal Networks we have to expect the same 
indicators to form a super-structure for the type of Nigerian criminal networks. 
 
The point of minimal trust is one that needs to be scrutinized. We should expect some higher 
level of cooperation toward law enforcement if trust is at such a low level. This scenario of 
law enforcement cooperation is not particularly described in the current literature regarding 
Nigerian Criminal Networks. We must therefore look elsewhere for an explanation. Still, the 
fact that the networks consist of mostly kinsmen from the same ethnic group or clan must 
infer some basic level of trust. Perhaps we can talk about a particular ethnic-trust. This mode 
of trust needs not to be continually renewed or strengthened as the basis of trust is already in 
place through mutual ethnic bonds. The ethnic specific rituals that seem to be a part of 
Nigerian Criminal Networks must therefore be the tool of strengthening bonds of trust where 
this is needed. 
 
The notion of “adapting readily to any new environment” is also interesting. Can we also here 
sketch some basic connection to the Economy of Affection? Nigerian citizens are broadly 
dependent on creating social networks for higher life-quality security. This is because of a 
failed state environment where rudimentary demands like security, social-care, health 
concerns and education is not met in an adequate level by the Nigerian federation. The social 
“intelligence” or mechanics of social networking may give Nigerians abroad a higher capacity 
of adapting to local society. This is of course dependent on which way we define “adapting to 
society” in the first place. We may talk about some basic level of social-logic that spans 
ethnicity, but the empiric material regarding the way abroad Nigerian Criminal Network’s 
adapt into foreign society in this thesis, is not broad enough to present anything but a general 
discussion. 
 
5.3.2. Social networks 
 
As both Mcillwain and Block identify social networks as an important part of both upper 
world relations and the lower-world, where the mafia is thought to exist, this became one of 
the factors that were found to be consistent within Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese 
types of organized crime. 
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The social networking factor resonates in the southern Italy region as we can find in Putnam, 
Mcillwain and Gambetta’s literature, but is perhaps even stronger in the Chinese form of 
organized crime, where the Guanxi-networks seems to be an institutionalized part of the 
Chinese society. As such, this may even be a serious obstacle to overcome for future Chinese 
economic development. 
 
However, when looking at Nigerian Criminal Networks through the lens of social networking 
theory we see even further implications than the Chinese scenario. The historical context of a 
divided Italy through Habsburg-Spain dominance, as sketched by Gambetta, have certain 
points of similarity when looking on Ekeh and Mamdani’s arguments around colonization, 
and the implications this have for the current southern Saharan “democratic” states. Both are 
instances of an external force dominating an area through the means of setting internal 
factions against each other. But this is also the place where the similarities stop. 
 
Southern Italy and China can under no circumstance be said to have achieved the same level 
of integration between Criminal Networks and upper-level political spheres as Ebbe argues in 
his text. Neither do they seem to have the same level of “loose” or non-hierarchical networks 
as the Nigerian type. The Chinese form appear to come the closest, but also here there is no 
political criminal-nexus as Ebbe claims in the Nigerian context. 
 
There is perhaps some non-criminal factors connected to the ad-hoc based small loose type of 
Nigerian Criminal Networks. Aning argues, for example, that these particular characteristics 
can be turned to advantage in modern Globalized markets. That modern Technology both in 
electronics and travel infrastructure is particular well suited to the Nigerian type of networks, 
also the non-criminals. There may be some basis to argue that this form of structure is 
traditional in west-African traders. However, Aning, does not touch upon why these forms are 
traditional in the first place. Both Ekeh’s two publics and Hyden’s economy of affection may 
give some clues to why this tradition has appeared in the first place, based in southern-
Sahara’s rather unique modern History.  
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5.3.3. The 419-Industry 
 
The 419 factor or e-mail fraud factor, did not appear in our attempt to isolate some common 
indicators between our selected types of Organized Crime other than Nigerian Criminal 
Networks through the method of agreement. Using the basics of method of difference, this 
tells us that the e-mail fraud factor stands even further out than Ebbe’s political criminal 
nexus. The 419 factor did of course not appear out of the blue. It has been implicated 
throughout the thesis. But after partly analysing the Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese 
forms of Organized Crime, the indicator did not appear in any of these forms at all. If this was 
only a small part of NCNs this would of course make the indicator less significant. But it is 
hard to ignore the role the 419-industry has in Nigerian Criminal Networks, both in Nigeria 
itself and abroad, as Nigerians are the most dominant actors according to Edelson. Almost all 
literature describing some level of NCN’s takes the factor into account. It would therefore be 
negligence on the thesis part not to give it some importance. This, together with the apparent 
unique role 419 factor, makes it perhaps the most significant divergent factor explaining 
Nigerian Criminal Networks particular brand in the thesis. 
 
Ebbe also mentions the importance of 419 networks in Nigeria internally through his research. 
He does not connect 419 isolated to e-mail fraud, various other forms of fraud is also in play 
according to him. But it is probably still a significant part of the fraud-scheme. It is only 
logical that Criminal Networks spread their resources into several types of franchise to 
maximized returns and minimize economic risk. This does not make e-mail fraud any less 
significant as such. 
 
It is important to underline the very mechanics involved in a 419 or e-mail fraud. The 
magnitude of spam bombarding the world’s collective mailboxes is of course important. But 
the way these frauds are done, through benevolent persuasion and social bonding, must imply 
some level or particular skill of social intelligence. 
 
Finally we must mention the weak level of Internet-infrastructure in Nigeria. How can it be 
dominant in e-mail fraud franchises when it has one of the worlds less developed Internet 
infrastructure? There has to be some further explanation to why this brand of Criminal 
Networks emanates mainly from here. 
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5.3.4. Economy of affection 
 
Though Hyden’s economy of affection is a theory that is meant to span Africa as a whole, it 
shares especial connotations with Nigeria. On the one hand is has to be significant for Nigeria 
as it is simply a part of Africa. On the other hand Hyden uses Ekeh’s theory and many 
examples from Nigeria to underline his hypothesis. Ekeh can also be said to use his cases of 
example mainly from the Nigerian sphere. There should therefore be no doubt to the 
significance of the Economy of Affection on the Nigerian sphere, but what impact can it have 
on the Criminal Networks? 
 
Through Nettl and Putnam, we have with the first established a complementary basis for the 
economy of affection, as Nettl gives a general insight in the inherent problem of concepts of 
state, which Hyden also uses as an important factor to explaining the mechanics behind 
economy of affection. Putnam shows us some signs of economy of affection not being 
singular to Africa, but also in existence in Europe, perhaps particularly in the southern part. 
 
Why do participants in Nigerian Criminal Networks try to justify their actions? To justify 
crime for personal benefit is not uncommon in itself, but the particular arguments used in this 
instance is more connected to political statements, rather than personal tragedy. Both Shaw 
describing Nigerian drug-dealers in South-Africa, and Edelson describing participants in 419-
frauds, have found this idiosyncrasy. Remembering Ekeh’s point around why the state is prey 
and informal networks the security-net, this factor becomes even more suggestive. Much of 
the same dynamics in the economy of affection, the particularisms of colonialism, the 
movement legacy where the former imperial states are the African political spheres “enemy”, 
seems to be represented in the very defence of Nigerian Criminal Networks actions. It is of 
course not very surprising taking into account the political environment, but still gives a 
connection between Economy of Affection and Nigerian Criminal Networks. 
 
There is also the historic context to take into account. Aning argues that the way the Criminal 
Networks functions is especially streamlined to the reality of a modern global economy 
through the “traditional” ways of trade. This also resonates with Economy of Affection 
emphasis on the colonial period, the about 100 years where the continent went through 
significant basic institutional changes and the way the state were anything but a accepted 
means of organizing society. Ekeh also argues in the direction that the traditional informal 
 97 
system is still the most important through his two publics. This also lends some credibility 
that the Economy of Affection forms the way Nigerian Criminal Networks works to some 
degree. 
 
Even though the economic collapse/change factor did not give us any direct difference from 
Nigerian Criminal Networks toward other forms, it may have indirectly given us a further 
pointer toward the fragility of the Nigerian federation versus the informal. It is suggestive the 
way the oil-boom collapse resulted in higher levels of corruption and at the same time higher 
level of Criminal Networks, both at home and abroad. 
 
We must also look upon the factor of 419 e-mail fraud against the economy of affection. Is it 
not plausible that individuals brought up in a society where the informal is more important 
than the informal, where social networking and the people you know gives the security on 
most areas rather than the state, shows us some of the dynamics in Economy of Affection 
implied in 419 fraud? Can it not give individuals a higher potential for social networking 
skills when their most important day-to-day skills are navigating the social ladders and 
networks rather than finding their way through a bureaucratic states maze of services? Is it not 
then possible that the somewhat unique dynamic of 419 fraud in the Nigerian Criminal 
Networks has evolved partly because of this affinity toward social networking? It is not the 
sole explanatory factor, but the Economy of Affection (EoA) must have some significance 
upon the particular way 419 e-mail fraud is connected to Nigerian Criminal Networks. 
 
Finally, Ebbe’s political criminal nexus also have some connections to EoA. This is perhaps 
the most clear link since its inherent dynamic involve Ekeh’s two publics that both Hyden and 
Ebbe uses in their arguments. That Criminal Networks seems to be so integrated in politics 
may just be another aspect of the informal dictating the way formal institutions work as 
Hyden uses in his very definition of Economy of Affection.  
 
We can than see parts of a picture, showing us the way traditional dynamics have dominated 
society, were the informal has been the significant factor rather than a state structure, as 
means of achieving progress for individuals. This seems also to have played a part in the way 
Nigerian Criminal Networks functions both internally in Nigeria and externally through 419 
e-mail fraud, and the way the very Networks are organized through loose ad-hoc based 
continuously changing relations. 
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5.3.5. Population factor 
 
We have in the preceding text found some indicators upon why Nigerian Criminal networks 
have their specific indicators through theory that is after all not attempting to describe Nigeria 
in particular. However, it is hard to disregard the fact that much of the empiric cases that both 
Ekeh and Hyden use are Nigerian. Still a further possible factor for why Nigerian Criminal 
Networks are more prominent than other west-African or African criminal networks may lie 
in the simple logic that it is by far the most populous area in Africa. This is also mentioned by 
Edelson. It is current count lies around 130 million citizens, but unregistered population may 
drive it into an estimate of 160 million. The next south-Saharan country is the Democratic 
republic of Congo with 55 million. This causal explanation is not comprehensively described 
in the text because of its simple logic in the first place, though it may indirectly give the 
diaspora factor some higher level of importance, but not in the way that the Nigerian diaspora 
is unique when set up against the Chinese for example. Both the diaspora factor, and 
economic collapse factor may therefore indirectly have influenced the causal reasons why 
Nigerian Criminal Networks are dominating other forms, but perhaps only through the 
population factor. The diaspora and collapse factor must therefore still be deemed 
insignificant as direct causal explanations to why Nigerian Criminal Networks appear in its 
particular form. 
 
5.4. Main conclusions 
 
We have in the thesis first established 3 factors that seemed to have similar foundations in 
Italian, Chinese, Russian and Japanese forms of Organized Crime. Having put these factors 
comparatively against the indicators and current literature on Nigerian Criminal Networks we 
had to disregard two of these as insignificant: migration / diaspora and economic collapse / 
economic change. Social networking however seemed to play a more special role in Nigeria 
and was deemed significant. It was not significant in the way it was unique to Nigerian 
Criminal Networks, but rather in the strength the social network factor played in the Nigerian 
society. The 419 industry was also found to be important to explain the particular brand of 
Nigerian Criminal networks as this indicator was not originally in the equation as it was not 
described in the other forms of Organized Crime. This factor was then deemed even more 
significant to describe the special brand of Nigerian Criminal Networks. 
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The thesis also attempted to find some of the explanations to why Nigerian Criminal 
Networks stands out with these factors. By using the Economy of Affection as analytic tool, 
we may have found some causal explanations. The particular colonial history of southern-
Sahara together with the way the informal dictates the formal gives us some insight into way 
social networks dominate both society and Criminal Networks to a particular degree. It also 
partly explains the way 419-industry is mostly dominated by Nigerians. It does not clearly 
gives us a causal explanation why Nigeria is dominant, since other African countries should at 
least have some higher level of involvement in 419 industry since they also are a part of the 
Economy of Affection, but this may be partly explained by Nigeria’s much higher population 
and indirectly diaspora. 
 
Individuals growing up in the Nigerian federation seem to have a higher potential for social 
networking since their weak state gives them little protection in economic, welfare, security 
and education spheres. This may be an explanation how the dynamics of Nigerian Criminal 
Networks works at present. This is not the only factor in why they work in their particular 
fashion, but the thesis gives, hopefully, some insights to why Nigerian Criminal Networks has 
it is particular idiosyncrasies.  
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